Nuclear Politics in Africa: Legal and Empirical Foundations

Victor Chidubem Iwuoha ； Bonn Obiekwe Nwanolue

《Tamkang Journal of International Affairs》 23卷1期 (2019/07) Pp. 119-181

https://doi.org/10.6185/TJIA.V.201907_23(1).0003

摘要

The deterrent value to Africa of a nuclear capability is imperative. This paper examines the role of African states in the international nuclear politics, especially in terms of participation in multilateral nuclear agreements as well as practical commitments towards acquisition of nuclear technology. Importantly, collaborative efforts toward - denuclearization of Africa, uranium commercialization in global scale, nuclear energy building and nuclear weapons adventurism form the labyrinth of Africa's visibility in nuclear politics. While African states are not unmindful of the dangers of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the policy orientation in the 1980s and beyond has thus, always been to try to balance the contradictions between the attainment of general and complete disarmament and the achievement of nuclear capabilities for progress and survival. The temptation of indulging in nuclear capability project or contemplating to do so could hardly be ruled out in view of the indeterminate process of nuclear power programmes. African countries like South Africa, Egypt, Libya and Algeria have all been implicated on accounts of clandestine development of nuclear weapons programmes, with unlawful technical assistance from identified nuclear powers. There is possibility of nuclear threshold states in Africa attempting or actually revitalizing their nuclear programmes criticality in view of the volatility of global nuclear-power balance, as well as the fast prevailing first-tier and second-tier nuclear proliferation rings, otherwise known as vertical and horizontal proliferations (i.e. Nuclear Weapon States proliferators, and unauthorized nuclear-power proliferators, respectively). In the African context, as with most nuclear powers, the decision whether or not to approach the nuclear pinnacle is purely political, although technical feasibility and cost are critical factors which affect choice.

關鍵字

Nuclear Politics ； African Security ； Uranium ； Nuclear Weapons ； Nuclear Proliferation

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