當股票交易雙方基於移轉控制權之目的,各自於公開市場進行買賣交易,但約定於市場外依合意之價格找補差額,此等行為之適法性如何?本文試從證券市場操縱、公開收購之公平收購原則及內線交易等角度,對於場外找補行為之適法性,進行分析。根據既有學說實務見解,行為人雖外觀上有操縱市場行為,但若係基於轉讓控制權之目的所為,仍不違反操縱市場之規定,但另一方面,此等行為若觸發我國強制公開收購之規定,將有可能違反公開收購應依同一條件收購之要求,而在我國實務對於「預定取得」要件之寬鬆解釋下,行為人違反公開收購下之公平收購原則的可能性進一步增加,而有需要就相關規定之解釋,再行斟酌檢討,本文並提出「重大消息之成立」及「重大消息成立後之股票買賣」的區別分析澄清場外找補行為所涉之內線交易疑慮。
When the parties of a shareholder transaction, for the purpose to change control, buy and sell shares in the public market but settle the difference based on an agreed price, whether such arrangement is legally enforceable? This article reviews and analyzes the above question from the perspective of market manipulation, best-price rule and insider trading. According to current interpretations by the academia and court, although the parties appears to manipulate the market, such arrangement does not constitute market manipulation as long as the parties lack the intent to do so. On the other hand, in the event that the mandatory tender offer mechanism is triggered, the arrangement of private settlement of consideration may violate the best-price rule. Given the lax interpretation to constitute the "intend to acquire" under a current court opinion, the possibility for the parties to violate the best-price rule further increases and the reconsideration of such interpretation is desirable. This article also proposes to distinguish the difference between the "occurrence of material information" and "transaction after the occurrence of material information" so as to clarify the question whether such arrangement constitutes insider trading.
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