馬英九主政下臺灣民族主義的檢視：普遍崛起及務實傾向

本文立基於原生論與政治建構論，檢視馬英九政府八年執政時期，兩岸經貿整合發展趨勢下，臺灣民族主義抬頭的現象。我們透過兩個指標：認知中國大陸人民是否為同胞，以及臺灣是否獨立，建構了四種臺灣民族主義類別：類別I，具有最少的臺灣民族主義成分（認為中國大陸人民是同胞，臺灣非獨立）；類別II，具有稍高的臺灣民族主義（中國大陸人民是同胞，臺灣是獨立）；類別III則具有程度上第三高的臺灣民族主義（中國大陸人民非同胞，臺灣是獨立），以及類別IV，具有最高的臺灣民族主義（中國大陸人民非同胞，臺灣非獨立）；這四個類別依序代表從最低到最高的臺灣民族主義含攝成分。本文主要使用2015年4月所進行的民調，為經驗分析的依據，並透過「中國人／臺灣人／兩者皆是」的選項以及統獨選項光譜之檢驗而確認這有次序性的四分類效度。本文除呈現四個臺灣民族主義類型的背景組成，並且驗證從理論文獻以及真實發展情形中得來的兩個假設：第一，普遍崛起—我們認為臺灣民族主義四類別中，其中成分最少的類別I，其臺灣意識的強烈程度並沒有與其他類別的群體有極大不同。第二，務實主義—我們認為臺灣民族主義成分最高的類別IV，與其他類別，在「不願意有戰爭」的務實考量方面，差距雖有，卻非全然不惜一戰。整體來說，結果驗證了我們的假設；本文則在結論中進一步提出相關延伸意涵及研究限制。

關鍵字

臺灣民族主義；臺灣意識；務實主義；兩岸關係；馬英九時期

並列摘要

This study examines the phenomenon of rising Taiwanese nationalism within the trend of cross-strait economic and trade integration during the eight years in which Ying jiu Ma has been in power, and takes primordialism and political constructivism asitstheoretical underpinnings. We perform cross-table analysis on two indices: whether or not respondents believe Mainland Chinese are compatriots; and whether Taiwan is independent in their estimation, to create our four typologies for Taiwanese nationalism (TN): Typology I, with the lowest TN (are compatriots/ not independent), Typology II, with slightly higher TN (are compatriots/ independent), Typology III with the third highest TN (not compatriots/ independent), and Typology IV with the highest TN (not compatriots/ not independent). The order of these four typologies from lowest to highest TN is confirmed through the ＂Chinese/Taiwanese/both＂ choice and ＂unification/independence＂ choice spectrum. We utilize telephone survey data collected in April, 2015 via a Random Digital Dial system to undertake analysis. Our study presents the background composition of the four TN typologies, and also verifies the two hypotheses derived from theoretical literature and actual developments: that 1) Predominance - we assume that levels of Taiwanese consciousness for respondents who fall into the lowest TN Typology I, are not vastly different from those of respondents classified into other typologies within the overall rising trend of Taiwanese nationalism; and 2) Pragmatism -we suppose that there is little difference between the group with the highest level of TN, Typology IV, and the others concerning the pragmatic issue of whether Taiwanese are willing or not to go to war against China for Taiwan independence .Overall, the results support our hypotheses, and this study further provides implications and constraints in its conclusion.