長任期董事會的審計人員選擇

Auditor Selection of the Long-Tenured Board

張文瀞(Wen-Ching Chang) ； 陳瑞斌(Jui-Pin Chen) ； 薛明賢(Ming-Hsien Hsueh)

《管理學報》 36卷3期 (2019/09) Pp. 279-311

https://doi.org/10.6504/JMBR.201909_36(3).0003

摘要

長任期可幫助董事累積有關公司的知識，也會加深董事和管理當局的友好關係，因此本研究目的在探討長任期董事會是否傾向選擇產業專家審計人員，包括會計師事務所以及會計師個人二個層次。本文以1992－2011年台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本，並分別以虛擬變數（董事會任期超過9年）與連續變數（董事會任期的平方）捕捉長任期董事會的效果，實證結果均發現長任期董事會傾向選擇會計師事務所與會計師皆達產業專家地位的審計人員。額外分析的結果顯示長任期董事會與多項內部公司治理指標呈負相關，但選擇的產業專家審計人員顯著降低長任期董事會公司發生財報誤述的可能。改以裁量性應計數衡量財報品質時，其結論依然存在。整體而言，長任期董事會公司的內部治理強度不高，但會選擇產業專家審計人員以彌補監督的不足，藉此提升公司的財報品質。

關鍵字

長任期董事會 ； 審計人員選擇 ； 財報品質

並列摘要

Long-tenured directors have greater knowledge and experience, resulting in higher monitoring effectiveness. However, they may be less effective because they are more likely to deepen their friendships with managers. This study aims to examine whether the long-tenured board is more likely to select an industry-specialist auditor at the audit-firm or - partner level. Using 1992-2011 Taiwanese publicly traded companies as the sample, and using a dummy variable (board tenure greater than 9 years) and continuous variables to measure a long-tenured board, the results show that companies with a long-tenured board are more likely to select an industry-specialist auditor at both the audit firm and audit partner levels. Our supplemental results show that board tenure is significantly negatively associated with the internal corporate governance variables. Additionally, the likelihood of financial misstatements by clients with a long-tenured board of an industry specialist auditor at both the audit firm and partner levels is significantly lower. We also use discretionary accruals to measure financial reporting quality, and the results still support our main findings. Overall, while companies with a long-tenured board have weak internal corporate governance, they select industry-specialist auditors as a remedy to enhance financial reporting quality.

並列關鍵字

long-tenured board of directors ； auditor selection ； financial reporting quality

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