員工認股權評價參數假設合理性與公司治理關聯性之研究

Model Inputs of Employee Stock Options and Corporate Governance

江宗哲(Tsung-Che Chiang)

指導教授 ： 蔡彥卿

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.10035

摘要

本研究探討員工認股權假設參數合理性與公司治理之關聯性，樣本期間為2004年至2007年第3季，分析方法採用OLS Model。其實證結果如下:
首先，本研究探討「員工認股權假設參數合理性之無風險利率與公司治理之關聯性」部份，實證結果發現，監事席次愈高、董監事持股質押比例愈高、控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈高者、董事長兼任總經理，愈有可能透過操弄員工認股權參數假設來進行盈餘管理；另外，模型實證結果也發現，在法人持股部份，當法人持股比例愈高時，公司透過操縱員工認股權參數假設來進行盈餘管理的機會就愈低。上述結果意味著公司治理較差的公司，愈有機會透過操弄選擇權評價模型參數達到操縱損益之目的。
再者，探討「員工認股權假設參數合理性之預期股價波動性與公司治理之關聯性」部分，本研究實證結果發現，法人持股比例愈高、董事長兼任總經理、時，愈有可能透過操弄員工認股權參數假設來進行盈餘管理；此外，模型實證結果也發現，控制股東董事席次控制百分比愈高、控制股東現金流量請求權愈高，公司透過操弄員工認股權參數假設來進行盈餘管理的機率就愈低。上述結果意味著公司治理較差的公司，愈有機會透過操弄選擇權評價模型參數達到操縱損益之目的。
最後，根據本研究以上實證結果顯示，公司治理變數對於利用選擇權評價模型參數進行操縱損益之顯著情形及影響方向不盡相同；但本研究之實證結果，根據大部份假說之相符，可推論得知，公司治理愈好之公司，該公司透過操縱選擇權評價模型參數之手法達到操縱損益之機率較低。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 員工認股權 ； 盈餘管理 ； 無風險利率 ； 預期股價波動性

並列摘要

This research focuses on the association between the inputs of model of employee stock options and corporate governance. The sample period is from year 2004 to the third quarter of year 2007. The analysis models adopted in the research is OLS Model.Empirical results suggest what mentioned below.
First,this study focus on the association between the inputs of model of employee stock options-risk-free rate and corporate governance. The empirical results are as follows:
1.The number of inspectors is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the risk free rate with statistical significance.
2.The percentage of shares pledged of directors is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the risk free rate with statistical significance.
3.The degree of divagating between voting rights and cash flow claims is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the risk free rate with statistical significance.
4.The chairman who is also the manager in the company is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the risk free rate with statistical significance.
5.The ratio of the stock held by the institutional shareholders is negatively associated with earnings management through controlling the risk free rate with statistical significance.
Second, this study focus on the association between model inputs of employee stock options-volatility and corporate governance. The empirical results are as follows:
1.The ratio of the stock held by the institutional shareholders is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the volatility with statistical significance.
2.The chairman who is also the manager in the company is positively associated with earnings management through controlling the volatility with statistical significance.
3.The percentage of the board of directors controlled by controlling shareholders is negatively associated with earnings management through controlling the volatility with statistical significance.
4.The cash flow claims is negatively associated with earnings management through controlling the volatility with statistical significance.
Finally, the empirical results mean that when a company with good corporate governance ,it is seldom to do earnings management through controlling the inputs of the model of employee stock options.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； employee stock option ； earnings management ； risk-free rate ； volatility

參考文獻

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