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  • 學位論文

企業弊端預防機制之探討——以揭弊者保護與不適任企業經營者失格制度為核心

A Study on the Preventive Mechanism of Corporate Fraud: Focusing on the Whistleblower Protection and the Disqualification of Unfit Director and Officer

指導教授 : 曾宛如

摘要


無論是哪種公司治理機制之建立,實行成效之關鍵在於執行該機制的「人」,若僅係建立徒有形式的機制,或刻意規避機制的監控,均將使這些機制無法發揮功效,也無法預防弊端接連發生。本文著眼於公司預防弊端機制之建立,特別是不易受人為干擾者,包括發現問題與解決問題之機制,發現並解決公司內部之問題,以預防此些問題未來造成損害,發現問題的機制與解決問題的機制必須兼具,方能有效發揮監控之效果。揭弊者保護制度與不適任企業經營者失格制度均屬於企業經營者不易介入控制之預防弊端機制,前者為發現問題之機制,後者為解決問題之機制,檢討我國現行制度,並參酌國際之立法趨勢,本文認為揭弊者保護與不適任企業經營者失格兩項制度確實具有補強我國現有公司治理機制之功能,尤其於106年爆發之永豐金案更充分顯示我國有建立此二制度之必要性。 很多研究顯示,公司內部弊端之發現有很大比例並非透過公司所設制的監控機制而是透過檢舉的方式揭發,尤其在公司高層舞弊或多人共謀舞弊的情形,一般公司內部監控機制相較難以發揮其功能,因此應建立揭弊者保護制度,鼓勵揭弊者及早將此些問題揭發,以避免後續造成的損害。而我國現行制度關於通報公司問題之揭弊者保護,散落於各法,僅保護通報某些特定事項者,並無統一規範,且保護涵蓋範圍不一,對於揭弊者保護仍有不足。 公司內部發現之問題,若係公司負責人或不具公司負責人身分但為實質控制公司之企業經營者之行為所導致的問題,通常較一般員工行為所導致之問題嚴重且難以處理,須有適當之不適任企業經營者淘汰機制。我國現行之不適任淘汰制度實際上難以發揮有效淘汰不適任董事之功效,無法處理不具董事身分之企業經營者繼續實質上控制公司的問題,且欠缺具有失格效果的不適任淘汰機制,無法使不適任的企業經營者在一段期間不得參與任何公司之經營,以避免其繼續對公司、其他利害關係人或社會大眾造成損害。 本文分別就揭弊者保護制度與不適任企業經營者失格制度兩方面作研究,關於揭弊者保護制度,為了能夠掌握國際上揭弊者保護制度之發展趨勢,主要參考各個國際組織對於揭弊者保護制度相關建議,附帶介紹符合國際建議或具有代表性之各國相關規範;關於不適任企業經營者失格制度,本文選擇研究之外國制度包括英國、澳洲、美國與德國之規定,英國與澳洲均採取董事失格制度,而美國與德國雖無董事失格制度,但其淘汰機制中仍有類似失格之規定,亦有參考之價值。 本文認為揭弊者保護制度與企業經營者失格制度對於我國為重要且必要之公司預防弊端機制,期望能藉由此二制度之研究,對我國未來之立法提供參考與建議。

並列摘要


No matter what corporate governance mechanism we establish,” the person” who operates the mechanism is the key point of whether the mechanism is effective. If the mechanism can’t be executed completely or is intentionally evaded by someone, the mechanism can be ineffective and can’t prevent fraud. This thesis focuses on the establishment of the preventive mechanism. Particularly those are difficult to be interfered by any person. The preventive mechanism of corporate fraud includes detection mechanism and solution mechanism which respectively can detect and solve corporate internal problems in order to prevent future damage. Detection mechanism and solution mechanism need to be established at the same time to supervise the company effectively. Whistleblower protection and the disqualification of unfit director and officer both are the preventive mechanism that corporate director and officer can’t control easily. Whistleblower protection is detection mechanism, and disqualification of unfit director and officer is solution mechanism. After reviewing our existing legislation and referring to the legislation trend in the world, this thesis concludes that our existing corporate governance mechanism can be reinforced by the legislation of whistleblower protection and the disqualification of unfit director and officer. The SinoPac case occurred in 2017 fully demonstrates the necessity of establishing these two mechanisms. Many researches showed that tips occupy a large proportion of detection methods in the company. Especially in the circumstances that fraudsters occupy powerful positions or fraudsters act in collaboration with others, company’s internal controls may be less effective in detecting those frauds. Therefore, we should establish the whistleblower protection to encourage whistleblowers to disclose frauds immediately and prevent the occurrence of damage. Regarding whistleblower protection in our existing legislation, we have adopted whistleblower protections in sectoral laws which only cover certain types of persons or only certain types of information rather than comprehensive and stand-alone legislation. Our whistleblower protection appears to be insufficient. If corporate internal fraudsters are directors or officers of the company, or non-director who de facto control over the management of the company, this kind of frauds tend to cause a lot more damage than general employees and are more difficult to solve the problem they had made. Our existing legislation of director removal system can’t operate effectively, and can’t deal with the problem that those directors or non-directors continue controlling over the management of that company. In addition, our director removal system lacks of disqualification of unfit director and officer which can prevent them from taking part in the management of any other company for certain period of time. As a result, we can’t avoid these unfit people continually causing damage to companies, stakeholders or the public. This thesis focuses on the whistleblower protection and the disqualification of unfit director and officer separately. Regarding the whistleblower protection, in order to keep up with world trends in whistleblower legislation, this thesis mainly refers to international recommendations of whistleblower protection, and additionally introduces some good practice in legislation as mentioned in these documents. Regarding the disqualification of unfit director and officer, this thesis introduces legislations of UK, Australia, US and Germany. There are disqualification regimes in UK and Australia. Although US and Germany don’t have disqualification regime, these two jurisdictions have developed their own system which has some effects similar to disqualification. This thesis considers that the whistleblower protection and the disqualification of unfit director and officer are both important and necessary preventive mechanism of corporate governance for Taiwan. Hoping through the research of this thesis, it will provide references and recommendations for our legislation in the future.

參考文獻


一、中文文獻(按筆劃排列)
1. 王文宇(2008),公司法論,4版,台北:元照。
2. 王澤鑑(2011),侵權行為法,再刷,台北:自刊。
3. 林子平(2017),刑法各論(上),3版,台北:元照。
4. 柯芳枝(2013),公司法論(上),9版,台北:三民。

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