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  • 學位論文

政黨輪替對政商關係價值的影響:以臺灣2008年總統大選為例

How the party alternation affects the value of connection: Evidence from Taiwan's 2008 Presidential Election

指導教授 : 江淳芳
共同指導教授 : 樊家忠(Elliott Fan)

摘要


本文以2008年臺灣總統大選為例、探討政黨輪替對上市公司價值之影響。上市公司將依其董事是否具有政治背景區分為與國民黨關聯的泛藍公司、與民進黨關聯的泛綠公司及其他中立之公司,並同時考慮被公股持有之多寡。結果顯示,在競選期間,當國民黨的預期得票率上升時,泛藍公司在股價表現上會有正向的異常報酬。而被民進黨執政之政府以持有公股形式部分控制之公司,當國民黨的預期得票率上升時,在股價表現上則會有負向的異常報酬。此外,在產業分析之部分,營建業類股則顯示了清楚的政治關聯效應:當國民黨的預期得票率上升時,泛藍的營建類公司在股價表現上會有正向的異常報酬、泛綠的營建類公司則在股價表現上有負向的異常報酬。金融業類股則不論公股為部分控制或完全控制,當國民黨的預期得票率上升時,股價表現上皆會有負向的異常報酬。本文之研究結果顯示市場預期政黨輪替所帶來的影響將隨著不同類別的政治關聯與產業別而有所不同。

並列摘要


This paper investigates how the alternation of ruling party affects companies' value in 2008 Taiwan Presidential Election. The high-frequency political prediction data is used to explore this issue. The companies are divided into groups by the types of political connection: connection with the Kuomintang (KMT), connection with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and others. The level of being controlled by the government is also taken in account. The result shows that the KMT-connected companies exhibit positive abnormal returns when the KMT's expected vote-share increases during the campaign; companies that are partially controlled by the government, which is run by DPP government before the election, exhibit negative abnormal returns when the KMT's expected vote-share increases. As for the industry analysis, the partisan effects show a clear pattern in the industry of construction. In the industry of finance, companies that are partially and completely controlled by the government both exhibit negative abnormal returns when the KMT's expected vote-share increases. The results show that the impact of party alternation varies among different industries and types of connection.

參考文獻


Yan-Shing Chen, Chung-Hua Shen, and Chih-Yung Lin. The bene ts
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Eitan Goldman, Jorg Rocholl, and Jongil So. Do politically connected

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