環境保護政策對中央及地方主導意願之影響

The Impact of the Environmental Policy to the Federal Government and the State Government Dominant Intent

劉士傳(SHIH-CHUAN LIU)

指導教授 ： 宋玉生

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201701937

摘要

在美國環境法規歷史上，聯邦環保局的集中監管一直是規範。然而，Williams III, R.C. (2012)文中認為，美國過去都由聯邦作為主導後來變成地方主導，過去美國皆為從量管制，後來美國採用從價管制，主要的原因來自於，從指揮和控制管制轉向更加鼓勵性監管的，本文中利用中央為主導Stackelberg調節模型、NASH均衡模型中發現，無論從量與從價管制，仍然都會是聯邦來做主導。

此外，我們還將政策實施和執行成本納入我們的分析。發現聯邦和州政府的均衡政策取決於這些成本。當政策實施具有規模經濟效益時，聯邦政府將在環境監管中發揮主要作用，只有在某些狀況下聯邦政府將放棄，改由地方來作主導環境政策。

關鍵字

環境聯邦制 ； 政策制度轉移 ； 政策和執法 ； Stackelberg 調節模型 ； NASH 均衡模型

並列摘要

In the history of US environmental regulations, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency's centralized regulation has been a norm.

However, Williams III, RC (2012) argues that the United States has been dominated by the federation in the past and has become a local dominance. In the past, the United States had all volume control, and then the United States adopted ad valorem control. The main reason came from the command and control to a more encouraging regulatory.

In this paper, the use of Federal Government-led sequential-move Stackelberg game model, NASH equilibrium model found that both from the amount and ad valorem control, will still be the federal to do the lead.

In addition, we incorporate policy implementation and implementation costs into our analysis. Found that the federal and state governments' balanced policies depend on these costs.

When the implementation of the policy with economies of scale, the federal government will play a major role in environmental regulation,

Only in some cases the federal government will give up, by the local to lead the environmental policy.

並列關鍵字

environmental federalism ； policy regime shift ； olicy and enforcement ； sequential-move Stackelberg game ； simultaneous-move Nash regulation game

參考文獻

11.楊慧敏(2017),《中央及地方環境政策的衝突與變化－地方政府先行之循序賽局》國立臺灣大學社會科學院經濟學系在職專班碩士論文。

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