透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.230.147.225
  • 學位論文

公司治理之董事會組成、股權結構與公司績效關聯性研究—以台灣電子業上市公司為例

The Relationship among Director Board, Ownership Structure and Firm’s Performance – Evidence of Listed Electronic Companies in Taiwan

指導教授 : 謝德宗
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


面對全球化競爭環境,企業想要從資本市場籌資,需吸引投資人注意,因此如何加強公司治理機制便是必須重視的議題。在台灣眾多產業中,電子業一向被認為最具國際競爭力,電子業屬資本密集產業,外部融資需求大,更需獲得投資人信任,因此本研究針對台灣電子業上市公司治理,探討對其公司績效的影響。 本研究選擇電子業上市公司為研究對象,並將研究樣本分為權值股與非權值股兩個子樣本進行比較,樣本資料期間涵蓋2005∼2011年,本研究以OLS、GLS與Panel Data迴歸模型進行分析,並檢定出本研究資料以Panel Data 個體固定效果回歸為最適模型,故本研究以此模型分析結果為結論。 本研究以董事會組成、股權結構兩類變數為自變數,以EPS、ROA、ROE為公司績效變數,以Panel Data迴歸模型分析出的結果為家族或集團控制董事會降低公司的績效;獨立董監事對於權值股公司發揮了監督功能,有助於提高績效,但對非權值股則不顯著;最終控制者需負擔大部分因本身失職行為而造成的公司損失時,較有動機監督管理者以提升績效,故對公司績效有正面影響;法人持股比例與績效呈現正向關係,顯示法人更具有專業能力可監督公司。

並列摘要


In the competitive world, business corporations need to attract investors’ attention from the capital market. Thus, how to enhance corporate governance mechanism becomes a worth-noting issue. Among all the industries in Taiwan, electronic industry has always been considered the most competitive on the global market. Electronic industry is capital intensive with a high demand for external financing, thus requiring more trust from investors. This study explores the influence of listed companies’ corporate governance on company performance. The research objects are electronic listed companies and two sub-samples are compared: weighted stocks and unweighted stocks. The duration of the sample information is from 2005 to 2011. This study uses OLS, GLS and Panel Data regression model for analysis, and tests out Panel Data entity fixed effect model to be the optimal model. Therefore, the researcher draws conclusions based on the results of this model. This study uses director board and ownership structure as independent variables, and EPS, ROA and ROE as variables for corporate performance. The results of Panel Data regression model analysis are: family or corporate groups lower company performance; independent directors serve as monitoring effect and thus improve company performance, but their influence on unweighted stocks is insignificant; when final controllers have to bear most of the responsibilities for the loss of the company, they have a higher motivation to monitor managers and thus it improves company performance. Institutional investors’ holding rate has a positive influence on company performance, showing that institutional investors are more professional in monitoring a company.

參考文獻


8. 財團法人證券暨期貨市場發展基金會(2011),《臺灣公司治理》。
2. 王健安(2002),《公司治理的模式與評估》,台灣金融財務季刊,第3輯第3期,159-187。
18. 謝佩芬(2004),「財務指標與非會計資訊對股價之影響—Ohlson模型之延伸應用」,中原大學國際貿易系碩士論文。
12. 郭志文(2012),「金控公司公司治理與經營績效之研究—以國泰、兆豐、永豐金控為例」,國立台彎大學社會科學院經濟學系碩士論文。
14. 葉銀華、李存修(2005),《公司治理研究報告第二冊—健全台灣之公司治理機制》,社團法人中華公司治理協會。

延伸閱讀