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  • 學位論文

以非合作賽局求解最佳公共停車場費率

Optimal Parking Fees For Public Parking Facilities-A Non-Cooperative Game Approach

指導教授 : 石豐宇

摘要


近年來由於個人化運輸工具日趨普及,不但造成都會區交通擁塞,亦造成停車問題日趨嚴重。停車費率雖為調節停車供需的有效工具,但目前都市中心區公有停車場費率偏低,而使民營停車場因費率過高而閒置,造成停車空間更形不足。為改善此一問題,公有停車場必需解除費率管制,使得與民營停車場得與公有停車場公平競爭,而其費率則應取決於市場之供需情況。因此,具有寡占特性及無轉移性的停車場經營事業,可應用賽局理論求得公有停車場與民營停車場之均衡費率。 本研究首先回顧目前都市停車管理之相關法規與策略;其次透過停車需求調查,了解不同區域影響停車場供需之因素,以建構合理的停車場報酬函數。停車場報酬函數包括區位總停車需求,駕駛對不同停車方案之選擇行為,以及停車場之成本函數。其中,駕駛選擇模式考慮區位、費率、步行距離與停車需求特性。 其次,本研究透過靜態與動態賽局之情境求解市場均衡下之停車費率。最後,本研究以台北市部分地區為例,進行實証分析。

並列摘要


Recently automobiles and motorcycles have become the most popular mode of transportation in Taiwan’ metropolitan area. Therefore, the conditions of traffic congestion and parking space shortage are more deteriorated. Although the most effective mean to reduce the use of private vehicles and the need for parking is to raise the parking rates in the downtown of metropolitan area, the parking rates for the public parking lots are generally lower than the ones operated by private corporation. As a result, the usage rates for private parking lots are low and the supply for parking spaces are insufficient. To improve the situation, it is necessary to deregulate the parking rates and the operators for the public parking lots. This study seeks to explore the market equilibrium of parking rates if the public and the private parking lots compete in the same basis by applying the theory of non-cooperative games. The study first addresses the current regulations and strategies in urban parking management; then we will develop a payoff function according to the demand and supply relationships for parking spaces among various areas. The payoff functions consist of the total demand of parking spaces, the model of driver’s choices on parking lots , and the cost function of carriers. The choice model will include variables such as parking rates, location, and walking distance. Next, the study solves for the market equilibrium with respect to parking rates under various scenarios of static and dynamic games. The static games refer to the scenarios that each player in the game has the information and equal competition power while the dynamic games refer to the cases that some parking lots have larger competition power and play the leading roles in the market. Finally, a case study will be presented based on survey data collected from Taipei metropolitan areas. The results will be analyzed and summarized as suggestions to the policy-makers for municipal parking management.

參考文獻


12. Owen G. 1982, Game Theory –Second Edition, Academic Press Inc., Orlando, Florida.
參考文獻
1. 藍武王,「都市停車費率訂定原則與方法」,交通部運輸研究所,運輸計劃季刊,9卷 3期,頁311-頁326,民國69年9月。
2. 藍武王,「台北市停車收費問題之探討」,交通部運輸研究所,運輸計劃季刊,9卷 4期,頁453-頁474,民國69年12月。
3. 徐淵靜,李為忠,「最佳停車供應量之研究」,交通部運輸研究所,運輸計劃季刊,13卷 2期,頁141-頁164,民國73年6月。

被引用紀錄


林威(2016)。停車場預約系統之車位定價研究〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201600794

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