Corporate Social Network and Bank Loan Contract

企業社會網絡與銀行貸款契約

劉志良(Chih-Liang Liu) ； 邱敬貿(Junmao Chiu) ； 王鈺仁(Yu-Jen Wang)

《財務金融學刊》 26卷3期 (2018/09) Pp. 27-89

https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.201809_26(3).0002

摘要

This study highlights the role that external social networks play in a bank loan contract. Using data on Taiwan-listed companies, we find that the social networks of CEO, CFO, and board members help reduce (increase) bank loan spread and liquid collateral requirement (loan size), particularly pronounced for the network to financial institutions. However, the network-loan relation is non-linear with a U-shape effect, suggesting that an over-connected network leads to higher (lower) loan spread and greater collateral requirement (loan size). These facts help resolve controversy of whether a social network is beneficial or detrimental to the firm.

關鍵字

Corporate governance ； social network ； bank loan

並列摘要

本研究探討外部社會網絡與銀行貸款的關係。以臺灣上市櫃公司為樣本，我們發現企業執行長、財務長與董事會成員的社會網絡有助降低（提高）貸款利差與抵押品要求（貸款規模），尤其是與銀行連結的網絡關係。然而，網絡與貸款是U型的非線性效果，顯示過度對外連結的網絡反而導致較高（較低）的利差與抵押品要求（貸款規模）。

並列關鍵字

公司治理 ； 社會網絡 ； 銀行貸款

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