家族企業特性與經理人過度自信對其舉債決策之影響

The Impact of Family Business Characteristics and Managers' Overconfidence on Their Capital Structure Decisions

張力(Li Chang) ； 蔡函芳(Han-Fang Tsai) ； 林翠蓉(Tsui-Jung Lin) ； 王禹軒(Yu-Hsuan Wang) ； 洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

《中山管理評論》 21卷1期 (2013/03) Pp. 123-163

https://doi.org/10.6160/2013.03.04

摘要

本研究探討過度自信經理人與負債水準的敏感度是否會受到家族企業特性影響。此外，進一步將家族企業的經理人分成由家族CEO與非家族CEO擔任兩類，以釐清在同樣具有過度自信的情況下，其敏感度是受到何種類型CEO影響。以2001至2007年臺灣上市（櫃）公司為樣本，利用三階段最小平方法檢測。實證結果發現：（1）過度自信經理人與負債水準的敏感度為正。（2）過度自信經理人與負債水準的敏感度受到家族企業釋放訊號需求較低且較傾向風險趨避等特性影響，使敏感度降低。（3）過度自信經理人與負債水準的敏感度減少主要是來自於家族CEO所導致；而非家族CEO使得過度自信經理人與負債水準的敏感度增加但不顯著。

關鍵字

過度自信 ； 家族企業 ； 負債水準

並列摘要

This study examines whether family business characteristics would affect the sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions. Additionally, we further classify family business management as family CEOs and non-family CEOs to distinguish which type of CEOs mainly affect the sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions. The sample is comprised of Taiwanese firms and OTC companies listed between 2001 and 2007. A three-stage least squares method is applied. The results indicate that (1) the sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions is positive; (2) the sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions reduces because the family business tend to be averse to the risk and the needs of signaling behaviors are relatively low; (3) the reduced sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions mainly results from the family business with family CEOs. In addition, the sensitivity between managerial overconfidence and capital structure decisions increases insignificantly for the family business with non-family CEOs.

並列關鍵字

Overconfidence ； Family Business ； Financial Leverage

參考文獻

洪榮華、李易政、陳香如、謝可杉，2009，「家族企業特性與負債水準關係之研究」， 商管科技季刊，10卷3期：491~525。

洪榮華、陳香如、柯璟瑩，2005，「從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與 負債之關聯性」，管理與系統，12卷4期：33~53。

Agrawal, A. and Nagarajan, N. J., 1990, “Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1325-1331.

Anderson, R. C. and Bizjak, J. M., 2003, “An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay,” Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1323-1348.

Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M., 2003, “Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2, 263-286.