資訊不對稱下勞工與政府之工會租稅賽局

Workers vs. Governmental Labor Union's Tax Policies in Asymmetric Information Games

王智賢(Jue-Shyan Wang) ； 王世綱(Shih-Kang Wang)

《社會科學論叢》 1卷1期 (2007/04) Pp. 127-162

https://doi.org/10.30401/RSS.200704_1(1).0004

摘要

在現今的社會中，工會所扮演的角色就如同是替勞工傳遞訊號的工具，不僅如此，其對於勞工的影響也十分地顯著。本文以Kessing和Konrad (2006)之模型作為基礎，以賽局中序列均衡(sequential equilibrium)的方法，討論在資訊不對稱的情形下，政府面對加入工會與否的勞工，所採行之租稅補貼政策，並嘗試放寬原本對於預算平衡的限制，找出對於政府當局來說真正有利的預算政策。

關鍵字

資訊不對稱 ； 序列均衡 ； 工會 ； 最適租稅

並列摘要

In nowadays society, labor unions act as a tool to pass on information on behalf of workers. This paper is based on Kessing and Konrad's model (2006). We used the game theory's sequential equilibrium (SE) method to discuss what kind of taxing or subsiding policy will be selected when a government faces workers's decision to join labor unions. Besides, we try to loosen the restriction of balanced budget and found a better budget policy which is really beneficial for government.

並列關鍵字

asymmetric information ； sequential equilibrium ； labor union ； optimal taxation