憲法與威權統治─總統職權的擴張與國民黨威權政體體制化的路徑

Constitution and Authoritarian Rule:The Expansion of the Presidential Power and the Institutionalization of the Kuomintang Authoritarian Regime

蘇慶軒(Ching-Hsuan Su)

指導教授 ： 黃長玲

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/博士(2018年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201801162

摘要

既有憲政研究甚少關注憲法與威權統治的關係。本文以中華民國總統職權擴張的過程，說明威權政治菁英維持與運用《中華民國憲法》水平權力分立的原則，進行權力互動與運作政府，同時懸置《中華民國憲法》對人民權利義務的保障，一方面排除台灣地方政治菁英參與國家層級的政治運作，另一方面排除一般公民由下而上的課責與政治參與。此一按照憲政框架建立、運作與修正的權力互動模式，驅動國民黨威權政體體制化。

本文按章節依序指出：首先，《中華民國憲法》因為國共內戰與「敵我對立」的外生因素而確立其政治地位。其次，黨政菁英依循憲政規範進行權力互動，此一於法有據的互動模式成為鞏固《中華民國憲法》的內生因素。最後，由於蔣介石為了統治上的需要而不斷擴張總統職權，促使黨政菁英修正權力互動的模式，而使體制化的路徑向《動員戡亂時期臨時條款》傾斜。不過，由於權力互動模式將台灣地方菁英隔離在外，而失去政治甄補功能，因此在國際環境改變與黨政菁英老化後，權力互動模式即無法維持其封閉性，最終只能走向開放政治體制的途徑。

關鍵字

中華民國憲法 ； 國民黨 ； 蔣介石 ； 威權主義 ； 權力分享

並列摘要

The existing research on constitutional politics rarely touches upon the relationship between constitution and authoritarian rule. By examining the expansion of the power of the President of the Republic of China, this study aims to illustrate how political elites in the authoritarian regime maintained and made use of the principle of horizontal separation of powers stipulated in the ROC Constitution to interact with other powers and operate the government, but at the same time suspended the part of the ROC Constitution that guarantees the protection of people’s rights. The political elites of the authoritarian regime thus were able to exclude Taiwanese local political elites from the national-level political operations on the one hand, and bar the political participation of citizens and political accountability from the political arena on the other hand. This model of power interaction that was established, operated, and modified according to the ROC constitutional framework had led to the institutionalization of the KMT authoritarian regime.

In chapter order, this study first points out that the political status of the ROC Constitution had been consolidated due to the exogenous factor of the Chinese Civil War and the political antithesis; secondly, the political elites of the regime and the party establishment undertook power interactions in compliance with the constitutional regulations, which became the endogenous factor of the consolidation of the ROC Constitution. Lastly, while Chiang Kai-shek had to expand his presidential power for his rule, the expansion made the political elites of the regime revisit the model of power interaction and tilted the path of institutionalization toward the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. However, as the model of power interaction excluded the Taiwanese local elites and thereby lacked the function of political recruitment, this model of power interaction could not retain its closed nature and the regime had no choice but to open up after the geopolitical environment changed and the political elites of the regime and the party establishment aged.

並列關鍵字

Constitution of the Republic of China ； Kuomintang ； Chiang Kai-shek ； Authoritarianism ； Power-sharing

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