框架、對手期待與報酬大小對重複的獨裁者遊戲的影響

The Effects of Frame, Receiver's Expectation and Amount of Money on Repeated Dictator Game

彭思諺(Ssu-Yen Peng)

指導教授 ： 洪瑞雲

國立交通大學/管理學院/工業工程與管理系所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6842/NCTU.2009.00893

摘要

本研究的目的在探討框架 (拿取、分給、中性)、練習、對手期待 (有、無) 與報酬大小對獨裁者遊戲的影響。161位大學生和研究生被隨機分派到3 (拿取、分給、中性框架) × 2 (對手有、無期待) 的六組實驗情境之中，每個人皆要進行四次獨裁者遊戲，四次遊戲中的共享報酬分為兩筆小金額和兩筆大金額。框架與對手期待為組間變項，藉由語意線索和賽局規則來操弄；練習與報酬大小為組間變項。參與者分配給對手的比例為此研究的依變項。結果發現參與者在報酬為大金額時較自利，但在第二次練習時，分給框架組給對手的比例顯著高於中性框架組，拿取框架組也較中性框架組高，但差異不顯著。對手對賽局的期待的效果在第一次練習時顯著，知道對手有期待的參與者給的分配反而比對手無期待時要低，但隨著練習此差異消失。這些現象顯示，當人擁有對共有資源的絕對分配權時，人會傾向自利，且隨著利益變大，自利的程度即會上升。框架與對手期待等因素雖會暫時改變此自利的程度，但效果只是暫時的。

關鍵字

獨裁者遊戲 ； 框架效應 ； 練習 ； 對手期待 ； 報酬大小

並列摘要

One hundred and sixty one participants were randomly assigned to frame (give, take, neutral) × receiver’s expectation (expectation vs. no expectation) conditions to work on four dictator games with large or small sum of money. Frame and receiver’s expectation were between-subject variables manipulated by the linguistic cues and rules of the dictator game in the instruction. Amount of money and practice were two within-subject variables. The dependent variable was the ratio of money the dictator allotted to the anonymous receiver. Results showed that the most significant factor was the sum of money. Participants became more selfish (giving less) when the sum involved was larger. Give-and-take frame would increase the generosity of the participants slightly when compared to the neutral condition. But the effect appeared only on the second trial with the giving frame. Participants who were told that the receivers were waiting for the money would allot significantly less money to the other party unbeknown just in the first game. Giving less when people know that the others are waiting for the outcome of their decision is quite intriguing and needs further clarification in the future study.

並列關鍵字

dictator game ； framing effects ； practice ； receiver's expectations ； sum

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