本研究旨在探討銀行業因應金融危機調整之公司治理特質是否有效增加績效與降低風險,樣本涵蓋台灣銀行與中國銀行。研究結果發現,在全樣本下,獨立董事席次增加、董監事持股比例增加、機構投資人持股比例增加與董事長兼任總經理均使銀行總資產報酬率顯著下降。另外,在風險部分,董監事持股比例增加、機構投資人持股比例增加與董事長兼任總經理顯著降低資本適足率,使銀行承受較高破產風險,然而獨立董事增加則增加備抵呆帳涵蓋率,使銀行風險下降。在部份樣本方面,台灣銀行之獨立董事席次增加、董監事持股比例增加與董事長兼任總經理顯著減少總資產報酬率,在風險部分,獨立董事席次增加也會使資本適足率下降,但提升備抵呆帳涵蓋率。中國銀行的董監事持股比例增加、董事長兼任總經理則使總資產報酬率增加。董監事持股比例增加與董事長兼任總經理會降低資本適足率,造成風險上升,然而中國銀行的機構投資人持股增加會使得資本適足率以及備抵呆帳涵蓋率增加,使銀行風險降低。
This paper examines whether adjusting the characteristics of corporate governance to cope with the global financial crisis has a positive impact on bank performance and risk. Our sample includes banks in Taiwan and China. In the total sample, we find that if the ratio of independent directors, the share ratio of directors and supervisors and the share ratio of institutional investors increase and chairman of the board also pluralize as CEO, return on assets (ROA) significantly decrease. In addition, if banks increase the share ratio of directors and supervisors and the share ratio of institutional investors and if chairman of the board also pluralize as CEO, capital adequacy ratio reduced. Banks are exposed more to default risk. However, increased ratio of independent directors increases loan loss coverage ratio, which reduces the risk of default. In the subsample of Taiwan, if banks increase the ratio of independent directors and the share ratio of directors and supervisors and if chairman of the board also pluralize as CEO, ROA decrease significantly. Moreover, increased ratio of independent directors decreases capital adequacy ratio, but increase loan loss coverage ratio. In the subsample of China, if banks increase the ratio of independent directors and if chairman of the board also pluralize as CEO, ROA increases. In addition, They decrease capital adequacy ratio. However, increased institutional shareholding increases both capital adequacy ratio and loan loss coverage ratio and, then, default risk decreases.