公司經營權爭奪之法律與賽局分析：以2018年公司法修法為核心

2018年公司法全盤修正，針對股東提案權、股東名簿提供與董事提名制中出現的違法行為，提高罰鍰上限，並增訂第173條之1，使繼續三個月以上持股過半之股東得自行召集股東會，臺灣公司經營權爭奪議題，因此面臨嶄新變局。本文以賽局模型與個案研究評估修法成效，得出三點結論。第一，欲遏止經營權爭奪中的違法行為，主管機關所處罰鍰，應使違法行為成本大於因此增加之預期利益，然而現實中新法所設罰鍰上限、連續處罰之規定，無法達成此結果。第二，股東會召集方之主場優勢若遭限制，對各制度間行為人之守法誘因，有不同影響。第三，公司法第173條之1之增訂，確實有助於打破經營僵局，為經營權爭奪之結果提供多種可能。本文並透過實證資料，檢視新法對公司股權結構、家族企業傳承之影響，發現具備公司股權趨於集中、家族企業以閉鎖性公司作為傳承工具之現象。基於上述分析結果，本文主張立法者須明文違法行為之事後救濟管道、加重董事違法責任，並考量股權結構的變化，釐清公司法第173條之1於經營權爭奪中之定位，家族企業則應避免內部成員與外人結合爭奪經營權，同時確保閉鎖性公司以外之傳承途徑。

關鍵字

經營權爭奪；賽局理論；公司法修正；公司法第173條之1 ；股權結構；家族企業傳承

並列摘要

The 2018 Company Act Reform (the reform) changes the status quo of the contests for corporate control in Taiwan. It increases penalties for infringement of shareholders’ proposal right, refusing to provide the register of shareholders and abuse of shareholder director nominations. Furthermore, by the amendment of Article 173-1 of the Company Act, shareholders who continuously hold over 50% of a company’s outstanding shares for a period of three months or more, are entitled to convene a special meeting of shareholders on their own. This article evaluates the effectiveness of the reform through game-theoretic as well as case study approaches, and reaches three conclusions. First, to deter unlawful acts in the contests for corporate control, theoretically, fines imposed by the authorities should make the cost of acts exceed the expected net benefit. However, in reality, revisions to raise the upper limit of fines and add consecutive penalties in the Company Act may not achieve the result. Second, if the home-court advantage of the party calling a special meeting is restricted, it may affect people’s incentives to obey the regulations mentioned above in different ways. Lastly, the amendment of Article 173-1 does help break the deadlock and provide various outcomes of the corporate control contests. This article also uses empirical data to shed light on the influence exerted by the reform to the ownership structure of corporations and family business succession. It then discovers a trend toward ownership concentration, and that close companies become the instrument of succession for family businesses. Based on the analysis above, this article suggests that legislators need to make ex-post remedies available for the unlawful acts, aggravate responsibility for director misconduct in such cases, and clarify the role and positioning of Article 173-1, with the change of ownership structure in mind. In addition, not only should a family business be alert to its members uniting outsiders in the struggle for corporate control, but it should also ensure other instruments for succession besides close companies.