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  • 學位論文

銀行對生產性廠商之投資策略分析-以權益評價模式分析

The Analysis of Banking Firms’Investment Strategies on Productive Firms-An Option-Based Valuation

指導教授 : 林志鴻
共同指導教授 : 鮑世亨

摘要


隨著金融管制的鬆綁,銀行為求發展不但規模日益擴大,對於各項投資的方式也走向多元化,因此,政府各項對於銀行或金融機構的管制措施,應更審慎考量其適當性,何者應保留,何者可開放,如此方可達到金融健全及金融發展雙方兼顧的理想。 本研究探討生產性廠商對彼此行為的猜測變量以及資本管制下的資本存款比會如何影響銀行持有生產性廠商股份的行為,與銀行最適放款利率的決定。研究重點在於試圖建立一個利率制定之模型,導入Black and Scholes (1973)提出的或有請求權分析法,模型結合了投資組合理論中的風險屬性及、成本條件及利率制定行為的廠商理論。本研究假設銀行廠商在追求權益價值極大化為前提之下,建立出其目標函數,分析其利率制定策略,以供政府及銀行廠商發展決策時參考。 本研究的兩個主要結果顯示:(1)生產性廠商之間的合作程度愈高,銀行的持股意願會愈低;反之,合作程度愈低,銀行持股意願愈高。(2)在固定猜測變量下,資本存款比的變化並不影響銀行廠商對生產性廠商之投資決定。根據這兩項結果,可得知銀行對生產性廠商的持股行為不會傷害生產市場的競爭結構,因此在法令上可建議政府適當地解除銀行持股的管制。

並列摘要


After the financial deregulations, banks pursue not only scale expansion but also investment diversification. Therefore, the government should pay more attention on the adequacy of how financial laws be established. This study analyzes how productive firms’conjectural variation and capital-to-deposits ratio affect banking firms’investment behaviors on productive firms and their optimum loan rate decisions. We focus on banking firms’rate-setting model and quote the contingent clam approach from Black and Scholes (1973). Our model involves the firm theories about risk attribute, cost condition and rate-setting behavior. We construct our banking firms’target profit function to analyze the rate-setting strategies for the consultation to the government and commercial banks on strategies making under the assumption that banking firms pursue maximizing their equity values. This study shows two results: fist, the higher cooperation degree among the productive firms, the lower inclination of banking firms’investment on productive firms; second, under the fixed conjectural variations, the changes of capital-to-deposits ratio will not affect banking firms’investment behaviors. According to these two results, we can understand that banking firms’investment on productive firms would not damage the competitive structure of productive market. Therefore, we can suggest the government loosen the limitation of banking firms’investment on productive firms.

參考文獻


Black, F., and M. Scholes (1973) “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,”Journal of Political Economy, 81, 2, 637-659.
Cavalluzzo, K. S., L. C. Cavalluzzo, and J. D.Wolken (2003) “Competition, Small Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence from a New Survey,”Journal
Cestone, G., and L.White (2003) “Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims,”Journal of Finance, 58, 5, 2109-2141.
Chan, Y. S., S.I. Greenbaum, and A. V. Thakor (1986), “InformationReusability, Competition and Bank Asset Quality,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 10, 2,
Clarke, P., and S.W. Davies (1982) “Market Structure and Price Cost Margins,”Economica, 49, 195, 277-287.

被引用紀錄


高健耀(2008)。放款承諾是否會造成銀行過度放款?〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.00537
謝翔(2008)。放款承諾、外部資金與金融穩定性:存款保險機構之論點〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2008.00534

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