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  • 學位論文

論謝勒的情感現象學與人格理論— 一種文本詮釋的進路

On Max Scheler’s Phenomenology of Feeling and Person Theory- A Method of Textual Interpretation

指導教授 : 孫雲平
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摘要


本論文探究謝勒哲學中的情感現象學與人格,謝勒在著作《倫理學中的形式主義與實質的價值倫理學》藉由現象學方法反省康德哲學形式主義問題,所造成實質價值倫理學的被忽視。因為康德形式主義倫理學將情感價值貶為後天的,並且將「自我」訴諸於先天形式,導致去人格化、去個體化與去情感生活的狀態。但是謝勒則提出情感先天主義、實質先天與價值先天的可能性。謝勒認為藉由對於實質價值被給予的偏好,才能夠顯現其價值的階層。而人則可以在心靈活動中承載價值,甚至在愛的活動裡昇華自身獨一無二的人格價值。 本篇論文以謝勒的實質價值倫理學、情感現象學與人格主義倫理學作為基礎。首先,從謝勒對於康德形式倫理學批判,探究實質價值的現象學意義,以及闡述現象學經驗與自然經驗之間的差異,所帶來的形式先天與價值先天的不同之處。其次,從謝勒的《同情的本質與形式》探討情感現象之中,不同人格的同感相互作用,並且涉及愛所意向價值昇華的活動。最後,說明謝勒主張人格的非對象化。人格的世界乃是作為所有心靈活動的整體現象,此整體現象顯示乃是獨特的人格價值。而人格價值也經由不同價值階層的價值承載,呈現出不同的人格典範。此外,個體人格也可以與總體人格之間彼此同感,且兩者在社群關係之中有其情感價值相互的意向感受。 總而言之,謝勒提出人格在心靈活動的可能性裡承載不同的價值感受,而又可以在愛的活動中,讓人格愛成為最高價值。以上皆是在現象學經驗作為先天性的,不同於「自我」的功能性預設,以及不同於「自我」被實體化的問題,使得「自我」被作為一種事實性領域的掌握。因此,謝勒則以現象學方法來重新賦予人格活生生的情感生活之意義,此為謝勒現象學的貢獻之處。

關鍵字

形式主義 先驗自我 實質價值 同感 人格

並列摘要


The thesis aims at the phenomenology of feeling and the Person in Max Scheler’s philosophy. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Phenomenological methods are used to reflect problems caused by Kant’s philosophical Formalism, which leads to the negligence of non-formal ethics of values. Kant abates the value of feeling in Formal Ethics into a posteriori, and makes the “self” into a pirori, so that the situation of depersonalization, deindividuation, and eliminating emotive life appears. However, Scheler proposes other possibilities—an emotive apirorism, a Pirori Non-Formal Ethics, and a priori values—because value levels would be appeared by the preferring given from non-formal ethics. Then, one can bear the value in acts, and promotes the activity of love to sublimate his/her individual and unique personal values. The thesis is based on Scheler’s non-formal ethics of values, phenomenology of feeling, and personalism ethic. First, he discusses the phenomenological meaning of non-formal ethics from Kant’s formalism ethic, and elaborates the differences between phenomenological and natural experiences, which cause the differentiation of formal priori and value priori. Second, from his The Nature of Sympathy, we discuss the fellow-feeling interaction of different person from the phenomenon of feeling, and reaches to the activity from which love intends to sublime values. Finally, we illuminate that Scheler verifies a person’s non-objectification. The world of a person is a holistic phenomenon, demonstrating unique personal values, of all acts. Personal values manifest different personality models through different bearing of value levels. Personal individual can also generate fellow-feeling among collective person. Both of personal individual and collective person share mutual intentional feeling of values. In sum, Scheler proposes the possibilities that a person in acts may convey different values and feeling, and demonstrates love of the person to be the highest value in the movement of love. The above mentioned by Scheler are a pirori in the phenomenological experience, and become an insurance of factual fields, which are different from the functional presupposition of “self” and from the problem of substantiation of “self.” So, Scheler re-defines living person as the meaning of living emotive life. This is the contribution of Scheler’s phenomenology.

參考文獻


Frings, Manfred S . 1974. Max Scheler (1874-1928): Centennial Essays, The Hague: Nijhoff.
Scheler, Max. 2008. The Nature of Sympathy. With a new introduction by Graham McAleer. Piscataway, N.J. : Transaction Publishers.
Scheler, Max. 1998. Ressentiment. Translation, Lewis B. Coser, William W. Holdheim; introduction, Manfred S. Frings. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press.
張偉(著),〈康德、胡賽爾和謝勒在倫理學建基問題上的爭執〉,《國立政治大學哲學學報》第28期(台北市:國立政治大學,2012),頁131-180。
Scheler, Max. 1973. Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of An Ethical Personalism. Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

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