產業技術升級、進口政策與外國廠商的產業集中度

Technology Upgrading, Import Policies and Market Concentration of Foreign Firms

郭虹瑩(Horn-In Kuo)

《農業與經濟》 51期 (2013/12) Pp. 65-85

https://doi.org/10.6181/agec.2013.51.03

摘要

本文將Chiou et al.（2006）一文延伸至外國廠商生產成本異質的情況，文中並分析外國廠商的產業集中度是否會影響到本國廠商進行產業技術升級的誘因。研究顯示：即使在外國廠商成本異質的情況下，關稅較配額政策更能提升本國廠商的技術水準。另外，在關稅政策下，生產技術的選擇取決於外國進口廠商其產業的平均有效邊際成本，這個結果使得從價與從量關稅對於提升本國廠商技術水準的效果相同。即使如此，此二種關稅政策具有不同的福利效果。詳言之，本國政府可藉由從價關稅的課徵來提升外國進口廠商配置的生產效率，進而攫取其利潤水準並提高本國的社會福利水準。因而從社會福利的觀點來看，從價關稅會優於從量關稅。此外，對於關稅與配額政策福利效果之比較，在進口量均等關稅政策（import-volume-equivalent tariff）的比較基礎下，相對於配額政策，關稅化政策下市場的均衡價格與本國廠商的利潤水準會較低、市場的均衡產量與消費者剩餘以及本國產量則會較高。

關鍵字

產業升級 ； 成本差異 ； 產業集中度

並列摘要

By incorporating cost asymmetry of the foreign firms, this paper extends Chiou et al. (2006) to analyze the impact of foreign industrial concentration on the technology upgrading incentive of the domestic manufacturer. It shows that the tariff policies are more effective than the quota policies in upgrading domestic technology. In addition, the domestic technology level depends only on average effective marginal cost of the foreign manufacturers, resulting an identical technology level under both ad valorem tariff and specific tariff regimes. However, the welfare level under ad valorem tariffs is larger than that under specific tariffs as the rent extracting effect of the former is larger than that of the latter. In addition, we have also found that the equilibrium market price and the domestic firm's profit are lower but the total output, domestic consumer surplus and welfare are higher under import-volume-equivalent tariffs than those under quotas.

並列關鍵字

Technological upgrading ； Cost heterogeneity ； Industrial concentration

參考文獻

Anderson, S. P., A. Palma, and B. Kreider (2001), “The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 81, 231-251.

Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1984), “Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels,” Journal of International Economics, 16, 227-242.

Chiou, J. R., H. Hwang, and C. C. Mai (2006), “Technological Upgrading under Tariffs and Equivalent Quotas,” Review of International Economics, 14, 849-858.

Collie, D. R. (2006), “Tariffs and Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly: Ad Valorem versus Specific Instruments,” Manchester School, 74, 314-333.

Delipalla, S. and M. Keen (1992), “The Comparison between Ad Valorem and Specific Taxation under Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 49, 351-361.