清季中央與各省財政關係的反思

本文所要討論者，主要為太平天國以後，特別是甲午戰後迄清亡前夕中央和各省的財政關係。作者發現：(1)這一期間清政府與各省之間雖經一番討價還價，但藉著硬性攤派措施，還是能成功地從各省抽提到為數不菲的收入；攤派的運作有賴列強的支持，蓋大多數的解款指定用作償付洋債和賠款。除列強及其銀行界外，從攤派受益的便是清中央政府。短時期內，列強對中國內政與日俱增的影響力，與其說是削弱，母寧說是強固了中央；中央對各省遂仍能維持若干程度的掌控。(2)列強也在另一方面幫助清政府掌控省財政。按一八九八年英德續借款議定以江蘇等五省部分區域的鹽、貨厘為海關接管時，江蘇等省即失去為數可觀的最可靠的財源而陷於財政困窘。江蘇和浙江的厘金歲入，分別居當日全國第一、二位；這兩省抵作英德續借款的厘金數目亦至為大宗，財政上所受的衝擊亦至鉅。有見及此，清政府從這五省內和省外指撥若干財源抵補虧空，稱為掄補厘金。可是，清政府這樣的安排，所著眼者只在淤本身利益，對安排徒然泥淆搞亂整體的財政結構，毫不在意。五省的財政基礎遂相應地削弱。(3)撥解省分因財力所限，它們別無抉擇，儘先解送財稅的對象為中央，而非其他身陷苦境的窮困同儕。這種情況下，邊遠而稅入不足的省分如廣西、雲南、貴州、廿肅及新疆等所受打擊尤重。省當局對中央財務關係的增加，掩蓋了「區域間補償」及「超區域整合」。(4)過去我們討論十九世紀中葉以降中央和各省的財政關係時，大多強調在督撫主導下的新生財政機構所出現的脫序；相較下，對於各方所作的整合努力，則甚為忽略。事實上，在宣統元年清政府成立清理財政處整頓全國財政前，不單中央對省的財政機構有所整合；類似的情況也見於省政府與州縣的互動，儘管成績因主客觀條件不同而高下有別。土藥稅制的演變和趙爾巽在四川所創設的新徵稅體制提供了這方面具體的事例。(5)清政府既無能力，也無勇氣對稅制，特別是田賦，作大刀闊斧的整頓，省當局遂只好採取阻力較少的方式，諸如鹽斤加價、成色低下銀銅幣的濫鑄，雜稅中酒稅和契稅的課徵，以至鴉片稽徵，開闢稅源。短期間上述措施固然為若干財政竭蹶的省分帶來可觀的收入，不過與時推移，因種種因素的掣肘，仿如強弩之末，難以為繼。財力竭蹶實為當日全國大多數省分的共相。省當局當日頻繁地把起運中央的解款及其他指定作特定用途的餉源截留，與其說是反映出省當局的實力，母寧說是適得其反，只表示其財力衰竭，實不能視為財政上督撫專擅及中央失控。(6)即使經濟上最具割據條件的經濟實體－四川，其解付中央，或代中央償還洋債賠款，或據中央指令協濟他省的款目，所佔的總支出比重，前後或有變動，唯就絕對數目言，一直是有增無已；這當然不能簡單地認為清末該省對中央的向心力有所增加，卻適足以說明期間川省當局並無財政專擅自主的跡象。也許這不但四川如此，更是當日各省當局的共識。作者認為清末中央和各省極其錯綜複雜的財政關係應從較長的歷史演變角度加以考應，不能單純以非此即彼的零和進戲(zero sum game)視之。省當局既無能力，也無意願專擅自主，並沒有獨立於中央政府之外，然而它們似乎也沒有受中央有效的行政掌控；值得注意的是和中央一樣，當日的瞥撫也大大失去有效地監督管理省財政的能力，財權大受其屬吏所制約。在探究清末中央和各省之間的財政關係時，我們從「社會經濟領域」看問題，或較從政治層面切入，來得更為合適。

關鍵字

解協與奏銷制度；攤派與撥補厘金；各省新財政機構的整合；省財政竭蹶；四川財政

並列摘要

This article reflects upon the centre-province fiscal relations from the mid-nineteenth century on, with special reference to the last decade and a half of the Qing dynasty. My findings are: 1. There was much haggling over the tanpai (assigned quotas) between the central and provincial authorities; nevertheless, the central government succeeded in drawing in a substantial revenue by the practice of tanpai. As most of the appropriations were earmarked for the payment of foreign loans and Boxer indemnity, there was a connection between the use of tanpai and foreign influence, as the functioning of the former relied on the support of foreign powers. Apart from the foreign powers and the banking interests it was the central government which benefited from this practice. In the short term, the growing domestic influence of the foreign powers on Chinese politics strengthened rather than weakened the central government, which was still able to maintain a certain degree of control over the provinces. 2. Foreign powers also assisted the central government in the control of provincial finance in another way. In accordance with the second Anglo-German loan contracted in 1898, the lijin on commodies and salt in certain region of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei and Jiangxi were pledged as security and were put under the administration of the maritime customs. However, this would lead these five provinces into financial trouble as they would lose one of their most reliable sources of revenue. In view of this, the central government designated a number of other sources of revenue from both within and outside these five provinces to make good the deficits. Revenue designated for this purpose was known as the bobu lijin (compensatory allocation for making good the loss of lijin revenue). The five provinces soon found that the new arrangement made it impossible for them to make ends meet. The repeated appeals of governors-general and governors of the five provinces reflected the failure of the central government to identify workable sources to compensate the provinces for the lost revenue or co-ordinate systematic action to put the total financial structure back into balance once these funds had been removed. The central government cared nothing for the absurdity of the system of compensatory allocation as long as it worked to its own financial advantage. On the other hand, the financial basis of these five provinces was much eroded as a substantial proportion of their reliable sources of revenue was stripped from the provincial authorities. 3. As provincial authorities could mobilize only limited financial resources they had no option but to forward revenue to the centre rather than to their needy counterparts. This dealt a heavy blow to remote and revenue-deficient frontier provinces such as Guangxi, Gansu, Xinjiang, Yunnan and Guizhou. In short, ”inter-regional compensation” or ”supra-regional integration” was overshadowed by increasing provincial financial obligation to the centre in late Qing China. 4. Historians researching the financial aspects of late Qing history usually attach great importance to the chaotic state of the financial administration in which the provincial authorities enjoyed fill autonomy at the expense of the central government from the mid-nineteenth century on. They tend to overlook the financial integration efforts on the parts of both the central and provincial governments. In fact, before the Qing government took measures to reorganize government finance on a grand scale in 1909-11, it was not only the central government that made efforts to integrate the provincial financial system, but provincial authorities also took initiatives in the integration of machinery for revenue collection and disbursement under their jurisdiction. Institution of a new tax system for the consolidated collection of native-opium and Zhao Erxun's financial centralization in Sichuan are the most concrete examples. 5. Financial deterioration of the provinces was a common feature throughout the country. Due to ideological constraints and the existence of practical administrative problems the Qing government was unable to work out filly the potential of land tax as the economy grew. It was against this background that the provincial authorities increased their reliance on the practice of increasing the retail price of salt and excise on native opium. They also increasingly resorted to the collection of miscellaneous taxes as well as over-minting debased new-style silver and copper coins. These measures served their purposes quite well in the short run but many undesirable consequences emerged which were at odds with their long term interests. The frequent and brazen unauthorized withholding of revenue was evidence, not of strength and independence, but rather weakness on the part of the provincial powers. 6. Sichuan was an entity where the economic forces most favoured regionalism and centrifugal tendencies. Nevertheless, not only was its financial commitment to the centre increased substantially, but also its revenue was allocated for use by the central government. A considerable portion of the provincial expenditure was, in a sense, for services or material received by the central authorities. It seems that similar situations existed in other provinces as well. Viewed in this perspective we simply cannot regard the extremely complex centre-province fiscal relations in late Qing China as a ”zero-sum” game but should examine the long term trends in its historical evolution. There does not seem to have been enough effective central administrative supervision over the overall provincial fiscal system; the provincial governments were also unable to exercise effective supervision over the fiscal systems under their management. In studying the fiscal relations between the central and provincial governments, it is more appropriate to view the problem from a socio-economic perspective than from a political viewpoint.