新加坡選舉制度與政治效應－1988～2011年國會選舉分析

The Electoral System in Singapore and its Political Effects (1988-2011)

施奕任(Yi-Jen Shih)

《政治學報》 52期 (2011/12) Pp. 65-99

https://doi.org/10.6229/CPSR.2012.52.03

摘要

本文透過新加坡選舉局選舉結果資料庫的實證資料，分析1988～2011年新加坡國會選制設計及其政治效應，特別是比例性偏差的問題。從選票結構層面來看，新加坡還制呈現三種特徵。一、單選區相對多數決具有贏者全拿的特性，造成行動黨1980年代以來平均獲得六成得票率，卻壟斷國會多數席次；二、單選區相對多數決在選舉過程中造成多數選區形成兩黨競爭的局面，除了行動黨同額自動當選選區，1988年以來僅有14個三黨以上競爭選區，不僅比重偏低且參選的第三黨或候選人多產生被邊緣化的結果；三、多數兩黨競爭選區反對黨策略性彼此錯開，各自選擇不同選區與行動黨對峙，避免同選區過多反對黨參選稀釋票源，鷸蚌相爭反而增加行動黨當選機會。從選區規模層面來看，新加坡在1988年以後採行單選區與集選區混合選制，並產生三項效應。一、集選區制度擴大贏者全拿的政治效應，更加容易造成政黨國會席次差距；二、反對黨受限於政黨實力，還區規模擴大而難以提出足額候選人參選；三、反對黨在部分選區缺席，除了使得行動黨自動當選，該選區選民形同被剝奪選舉權，被剝奪選舉權的選民數不斷成長，直到2011年因為選區規模縮小及反對黨改變選戰策略才有明顯降低。

關鍵字

政黨體系 ； 單一選區 ； 集選區 ； 選舉制度 ； 選舉政治

並列摘要

This paper analyzes Singapore Elections Department's parliamentary elections results to discuss Singapore electoral system and its political effects from 1988 to 2011. The political system of Singapore under the People's Action Party (PAP) has been one-party-domination after independence. Although some opposition politicians won seats in general elections since 1984, the PAP has maintained an absolute majority in the Parliament until now. Previous studies suggest that PAP's overwhelming victories in general elections are resulted from their campaign strategies, including the enactments of Internal Security Act, filings of defamation lawsuits, designing of serial number on ballot paper and the control of the mass media. However, from the perspective of campaign strategy, the disproportionality of turnout rate in general elections and parliament seats can not be explained effectively.Therefore, this paper emphasizes on electoral system instead of campaign strategies to explain the seats distribution in Singapore Parliament. On the aspect of the ballot structure, Singapore's electoral system causes three important effects. First, The single member plurality system, given its winner-take-all characteristic, allows PAP to dominate Singapore Parliament. Second, except some uncontested divisions, two parties campaign in most electoral divisions. Furthermore, different opposition parties would choice their electoral divisions respectively to challenge PAP's candidates.On the aspect of the electoral district size, the mixed electoral system of SMDs and group representation constituencies (GRC) cause three political effects. First, GRC system expands the influence of winner-take-all and aggravates the disproportionality in Parliament. Second, most of opposition parties were lack of qualified candidates to compete with PAP in GRCs. Third, because of the absence of opposition parties, the increasing number uncontested divisions reflects that voters in these divisions are deprived of their fundamental right to vote.

並列關鍵字

electoral politics ； electoral systems ； group representation constituencies ； party systems ； single member district

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