Decision Theory as an Aid to Private Choice

Rex V. Brown

《Judgment and Decision Making》 7卷2期 (2012/03) Pp. 207-223

並列摘要

A wise decider D uses the contents of his mind fully, accurately and efficiently. D's ideal decisions, i.e., those that best serve his interests, would be embedded in a comprehensive set of totally coherent judgments lodged in his mind. They would conform to the norms of statistical decision theory, which extracts quantitative judgments of fact and value from D's mind contents and checks them for coherence. However, the most practical way for D to approximate his ideal may not be with models that embody those norms, i.e., with applied decision theory (ADT). In practice, ADT can represent only some of D's judgments and those imperfectly. Quite different decision aid, including intuition, pattern recognition and cognitive vigilance (especially combined), typically outperform feasible ADT models-with some notable exceptions. However, decision theory training benefits D's informal decisions. ADT, both formal and informal, should become increasingly useful and widespread, as technical, cultural and institutional impediments are overcome.

並列關鍵字

decision-aiding ； decision theory ； private choice ； ideal judgment