地方談判籌碼的證據：對1980~2003年大陸各省投資行為的分析結果

Evidence of Provincial Bargaining Power in Reform China: An Analysis of Provincial Investment Behavior 1980~2003

趙學維(Hsueh-Wei Thomas Chao) ； 歐宏國(Hong-Kou Ou)

《社會科學論叢》 2卷2期 (2008/10) Pp. 1-61

https://doi.org/10.30401/RSS.200810_2(2).0001

摘要

本文修正了既有研究對於地方利益優先順位的假設，並首度結合代表中央控制與地方談判籌碼兩種觀點的主要解釋變項來分析1980到2003年問中國大陸各省級行政區國有部門的固定資產投資金額。主要的發現有：（一）1994年分稅制改革要建立透明客觀的政府問轉移支付制度的目標並不成功，中央愈來愈傾向用不透明的專項補助來支援地方財政；（二）中共中央對於省級領導的人事調動權，確實具有抑制地方投資總體規模的效果；（三）在中央委員會席次比重愈高的省份會分配到愈多的投資資金；（四）從各省的整體投資資金規模來判斷，中央委員會席次比重擴大地方投資的效果，在本研究的觀察期間一直都超過中央人事調動權的抑制效果。

關鍵字

中央地方關係 ； 互惠式問責 ； 地方談判籌碼 ； 固定資產投資 ； 官員輪調

並列摘要

In this paper, we revise the problematic definition of local preferences employed by previous studies and integrate explanatory variables from both hypotheses of central control and local bargaining leverage into an analysis of China's provincial investment in fixed assets between 1980 and 2003. Our major findings are: (1) The 1994 Tax Sharing System (fengshuizhi) reform did not succeed in establishing a transparent and more rule-based revenue-sharing system; the center relied more heavily on ad hoc earmarked transfers to allocate funds. (2) Central leaders' personnel management power over provincial leaders curtailed provincial investment size between 1980~1992. (3) Provinces with higher membership share at the central committee tended to receive higher investment resources from the center. (4) The impact of curtailing effect on the size of provincial investment has always been overshadowed by that of the enlarging effect hroughout the period under study.

並列關鍵字

central-local relations ； reciprocal accountability ； local bargaining power ； investment in fixed assets ； rotation of local officials