股東常會開會時間長度之資訊內涵

The Information Content of the Length of Annual Shareholder Meetings

沈信漢(Carl Hsin-han Shen) ； 何旻瑾(Min-Jin Ho) ； 張景宏(Ching-Hung Chang)

《管理學報》 36卷2期 (2019/06) Pp. 151-176

https://doi.org/10.6504/JMBR.201906_36(2).0002

摘要

在本文中我們研究股東常會開會長度的決定因素以及其是否對公司價值造成影響。我們搜集2010－2014年台灣上市、櫃公司股東常會資料，並在分析後發現當公司的資訊較不透明、業外轉投資比率較高、財報重編次數較多、董監事股權質押比率較高時，股東常會開會的時間長度較長。而開會時間較久的公司，在股東常會一年後經營績效與股價表現皆顯著較差。並且我們發現股東常會長度與公司表現之間的反向關係在資訊不對稱高與代理人問題嚴重的公司中最為明顯。我們也進行了一連串的穩健性分析以確認結果的穩定性，包括在模型中增加控制變數、使用配對樣本與進行模擬分析。總體而言我們發現的證據顯示股東常會開會時間長度具有反映公司價值的實質資訊意涵。

關鍵字

股東常會 ； 董監質押 ； 財報重編 ； 業外轉投資

並列摘要

We examine the determinants of the length of shareholder meetings and its impact on firm performance. We gather the information of annual meetings of public firms in Taiwan over the period 2010-2014, and provide evidence that the duration of shareholder meetings is longer for firms that have greater information asymmetry, undertake more non-operating investments, report more financial restatements, and whose directors pledge larger amount of shares. Moreover, firms with lengthy shareholder meetings underperform their counterpart firms in terms of profitability and stock return over the subsequent year. We also find that the negative relation between shareholder meeting length and subsequent performance is stronger for firms with greater information opacity and agency conflict. Our results are robust to a battery of checks involving estimating the regressions using additional control variables, a matched sample, and simulation. Taken together, these findings constitute new evidence on the information content of the length of shareholder meetings.

並列關鍵字

shareholder meeting ； share pledge ； restatements ； non-operating investments

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