- 期刊
處理戰後的勝利：國民黨、日本與共產黨對於正義的立場
Handling the Post-war Victory: The Stances on Justice between Kuomintang, Japan, and Chinese Communist Party
摘要
戰爭的本質並不在於對疆界的尊重，而是去打破現有的政治疆界。然而，戰爭結束之後，接踵而至的疆界重建卻是困難重重。特別是，戰犯審判如何粉墨登場以及日本帝國的軍人與特定社會群體將以何種方式處理這些議題，此類問題在1945年7月波茨坦宣言之後依舊是模糊不清。中國審判日本戰罪、漢奸與叛國者的政策提供了一個方式去處理前日本帝國的統治集團與過往的積怨，並藉此為中國過去所承受的暴行在法理上尋找一個慰藉。同時，面對此一議題，日本將以何種方式解決亦同樣關鍵，雙方都運用他們在法律上的智慧與司法上的能力去與對方較量，藉此展現他們訴訟的公正性。重要的是，中日雙方早在日本正式投降之前就已經開始準備這些事項。中國人的計畫與訴訟程序顯示了在日本投降之際關於正義議題的層次有二：第一、中國人認為審判必然為之，但是對於程序卻有著不一樣的意見。第二、即便在中國人當中，不同群體之間的「競爭」亦同屬激烈，因為只有少數人有能力去理解國際法律訴訟程序。這情況不僅限於中國，許多戰勝國也如同中國般在這方面尚力猶未逮。簡而言之，一切的局勢都還呈現混沌不清的局面。
並列摘要
War is not about respecting boundaries but about breaking them. The end of war, by contrast, centers on re-establishing those boundaries though usually in very different physical locations. Such dislocation can often serve to mask what really happened in the twilight between the end of war and the postwar because our assumptions are no longer valid. Precisely how war crimes trials would play out and in what manner the Japanese imperial forces and the larger elements of all segments of society would deal with these changes was far from clarified after the announcement of the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945. China’s moves to pursue Japanese war criminals, as well as charge Chinese collaborators or suspected traitors, offered a means to resolve the upturned former imperial hierarchies, dealing with grudges and finding legal solace to atone for committed atrocities. The manner in which Japan responded was equally critical and both sides pitted their legal sagacity and juridical ability against one another to demonstrate the righteousness of their own causes. Importantly, as well, both sides had already been preparing for such eventualities prior to the actual defeat. What the Chinese plans and procedures show us about the issue of justice at the moment of Japanese surrender is two-folded. First, the Chinese were aware that they could not afford to not hold war crimes trials of the Japanese but were of several minds concerning how that process would unfold. Second, competition was fierce among rival Chinese groups because there was limited personnel who had the ability to understand international legal procedures that were almost beyond the reach of the victorious nation. In short, everything was up for grabs.
參考文獻
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