Board Meeting Frequency and Managemeny Forecasy Behavior

Kam C. Chan ； Yi-Ning Chen

《Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting》 11期 (2013/12) Pp. 293-318

https://doi.org/10.6293/AQAFA.2013.11.11

並列摘要

We examine the relationship between board meeting frequency and management forecast behavior. Using a comprehensive sample of management forecasts in the U.S. from 1996 to 2005, we find that more frequent board meetings are positively related to a higher likelihood of management forecasts. Our findings in different forecasting horizons and forecasting directions are consistent with the notion that more effective and direct monitoring by a board (as represented by more frequent board meetings) influences managers to disclose more private information. Overall, board monitoring, as proxied by the frequency of board meetings, plays a decisive role in management forecasting behavior.

並列關鍵字

Board Meeting ； Corporate Governance ； Management Forecast

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