自發性合夥關係與共有資源的利用

如何避免「共有財悲劇」發生，一直以來都是共有資源與共同財產權研究的焦點。在解決共有資源過度使用問題的討論中，一些學者認為社會存在透過集體行動（collective action），來促進共有資源利用效率的誘因。近期，Heintzelman et al.（2009）即在探討現代社會中常見的合夥關係，對於共有財產利用的可能影響。然而他們的討論，是在合夥團體的利益分配法則為外生既定的前提下進行的，另外，他們也沒有考慮部份人可以不加入合夥團體的情況。為了使分析模型能夠更加符合現實，本文將調整Heintzelman et al.（2009）分析架構中的部份假設，在合夥團體的利益分配法則為內生決定，同時部份社會成員可以選擇不加入合夥團體的情況下，進一步探究合夥團體利益分配法則內生決定以及個人的合夥參與決策，在共有資源利用問題上的經濟與政策意涵。

關鍵字

共有財悲劇；合夥團體；集體行動

並列摘要

How to circumvent ”the tragedy of the commons” has always been a key issue in common-property research. In the discussion about the abuse of common resources, some scholars believe that society have an incentive to improve the efficiency of the common resources utilization by collective action. Recently, Heintzelman et al. (2009) explore the possible impact of partnerships in modern society on the utilization of common-property. However, their discussion is under the premise that the sharing rule of partnership group is exogenously given and without considering the possibility of non-participation of certain members. In order to make the model reflect reality, this research will adjust some hypotheses of Heintzelman et al. (2009). Under the condition that the sharing rule of partnership group is endogenously decided and anyone can choose not to take part in any partnership group, we will investigate the influence of self-induced partnerships on the efficiency of the common resources utilization.