摘要
康德對人的身體在哲學中的意義持一種遊移不定的立場。在《純粹理性批判》中，康德明確表達了在這個問題上不確定的立場，即他不能確定「我」是否能夠僅僅作為思維的存在者，而不是同時也作為身體的存在者而實存。這導致了B版的「駁斥觀念論」只能從經驗性的自我意識開始，並最終訴諸一個充滿爭議的持存之物。康德在晚期筆記中展開了多種「駁斥觀念論」的方案，但只有再次引入人的身體是相對於B版的突破之處。在晚近面世的「列寧格勒筆記」中，康德把「我」視為原初地、直接地作為世界存在者和身體存在者而實存，思維的我只是派生的，而且經驗性的自我意識與對象意識和世界意識原本就是一體的，「駁斥觀念論」由此達到了更高的層次。
並列摘要
Kant took a vacillating position on the role of the human body in philosophy. In Critique of Pure Reason, he explicitly expressed his uncertain position, that is, he cannot be sure whether the ＂I＂ can exist only as a thinking being, and not also as a bodily being. Thus, the ＂Refutation of Idealism＂ in B edition can only begin with empirical self-awareness, ultimately appealing to something persistent which is rife with controversies. In his late notes, Kant developed various projects about ＂Refutation of Idealism,＂ but only the reintroduction of the human body was a breakthrough relative to B edition. In recently appeared ＂Leningrad Note,＂ Kant put the existence of the ＂I＂ as a being in the world and a bodily being originally and directly, from which the thinking ＂I＂ derived, and the empirical self-consciousness and object-consciousness and world-consciousness is of unity originally, thus ＂Refutation of Idealism＂ reached a higher level.