反攻大陸之可行性：從「國光計畫」探析1960年代國軍戰力

蔣介石來臺之後，積極揭櫫「反攻大陸」，反攻大陸的方式，當然是軍事反攻，以戰爭方式推翻中共政權。由於美國在政治上的反對，蔣介石在1960年代初期成立了「國光計畫室」，研擬「國光計畫」，準備獨力進行反攻。本文以國史館史料與相關文獻為探討基礎，結合軍事戰史的研究經驗，從「國光計畫」的制定脈絡及推動狀況，分析1960年代初期到中期，國軍的狀況和戰力。研究發現，在「國光計畫室」成立時，中華民國陸海空三軍的實力難以在沒有美國出兵的情況下獨力反攻大陸。因此，蔣介石總統的「反攻大陸」政策，與其說是軍事政策，不如說是政治宣示和外交手段。最後雖然沒有實際執行，但從政治、外交效應看來，並非徒勞無功，證明他仍是一個理智的決策者。

關鍵字

反攻大陸；國光計畫；中華民國軍事；蔣介石

並列摘要

Since his retreat to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek had actively promoted the policy of anti-communism and reunification, and the most important element of this policy was "retaking the mainland." The proposed means by which to retake the mainland was of course a military conquest, i.e., to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime by military force. Despite objections and political pressure from the United States, Chiang established the "Guoguang Operation Office" in the early 1960s to draft "Project Guoguang," preparing to launch the counter-attack on his own. Based on archival sources at Academia Historica and other related official documents, in combination with prior research in military history, this article seeks to analyze the condition and combat capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC) during early and mid-1960s, when "Project Guoguang" was being developed. This article shows that at the time the "Guoguang Operation Office" was established, the ROC Armed Forces were in no position to retake the mainland without the U.S. sending troops to support them. Hence, President Chiang Kai-shek's policy of "retaking the mainland" was not so much a realistic military plan as it was a political gesture and a diplomatic tool. "Project Guoguang" was never implemented, but it did accomplished certain political and diplomatic goals. This finding demonstrates that Chiang was still a rational decision maker.