我與他人－胡塞爾現象學交互主觀性(Intersubjektivität)初析

在回顧胡賽爾對交互主觀性的研究之基礎上，本文主要討論「他人」經驗在自我領域內的構成，以及感入非自我和感入自我的關係。作者認爲，胡賽爾對身體在知覺中之角色的意向性分析是他對這樣的問題的回答：即「在什麼基礎上我把他人等同爲同我一樣的意識存有？」同時，感入非自我與感入自我間的差異並不是絕對的。喚醒我自己的「我」是從感入非自我到感入自我的轉變。雖然挑剔的讀者長久以來並不滿意於胡塞爾在先驗哲學領域對交互主觀性的討論，但他的論述對我們今天在談論交互主觀性上確是富意義的。

關鍵字

我；他人經驗；交互主觀性；現象學；胡塞爾

並列摘要

On the basis of looking back the development of Husserl's research for intersubjectivity, this artical discusses mainly the constitution of other's experience (Fremderfahrung) in the sphere of ownness (die Eigenheitssphäre), and the relationship between the empathy of non-ownness (die uneigentliche Einfühlung) and the empathy of ownness (die eigentliche Einfühlung). The author holds that Husserl's intentional analysis of the role of the body in perception is his answer to such a problem: on what basis do I identify others as conscious beings like myself? At the same time the difference between the empathy of non-ownness and the empathy of ownness is not absolute. To awake to my own Ich is the transition from the empathy of non-ownness to the empathy of ownness. Although the critical readers have long been dissatisfied with the account of intersubjectivity put by Husserl in the field of transcendental philosophy, his account is significant for our analysis of intersubjectivity today.