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牟宗三先生對「為何道德」的議論之再探

A Further Inquiry into Mou Tsung-san's Discussion on "Why Be Moral"

Abstracts


在前一篇文章〈牟宗三先生對「為何道德」之議論初探〉中,我闡釋儒家對道德的理由的觀點:身為擁有本心本性的人,便應該將本心本性實現出來。該文亦指出,這個結論遺留了一些問題:單憑擁有本心本性這事實,便推論出「將本心本性實現出來」的應然判斷,是否犯了從實然推論出應然的謬誤?其次,倘若認為是否要實現本心本性是一個自由意志的選擇,而不是邏輯的推論結果,那麼可以避過上述的問題,卻產生另一問題:一個擁有本心本性的人,可以拒絕將之實現出來,即不認取「實現本心本性」是道德的理由,倘若如此,這個人必須承認自己是非理性的。那麼,不去實現本心本性縱使是非理性,仍是被允許的(對於理論理性而言)。此則摧毀了「應該道德」的必然性。在這裏,我們見到一個兩難的處境。本文首先要解決這兩個問題。

Keywords

理性 非理性 本心本性 呈現 自棄 真實 虛妄

Parallel abstracts


In the previous article "An Inquiry into Mou Tsung-san's Discussion on 'Why Be Moral' ", I have made an explication on the reason for being moral as held by Confucianism: A person who is endowed with the original heart-mind has an obligation to actualize it. The article has also pointed out that an is-ought problem will be derived from this affirmation. Nevertheless, if it is considered that the actualization of the original heart-mind is not a conclusion reached by logical reasoning, but rather a choice made by free will, then the problem mentioned can be avoided. However, another problem might arise: A person who possesses the original heart-mind can refuse to actualize it thus does not endorse "actualizing the original heart-mind" as a reason for being moral. If it is the case, then this person has to admit that he or she is non-rational. Hence, even though not to actualize is non-rational, it is still permitted, from the point of (theoretical) reason. This result would undermine the necessity of morality. Here we are facing a dilemma which will be firstly dealt with in the present article.

References


黃慧英(2016)。牟宗三先生對「為何道德」的議論初探。鵝湖學誌。56,237-256。
(2015)。中國哲學與文化。桂林:漓江出版社。
牟宗三(1968)。心體與性體。台北:正中書局。
牟宗三(1979)。從陸象山到劉蕺山。台北:學生書局。
牟宗三(1985)。圓善論。台北:學生書局。

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