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中國創新試驗與國家冠軍私企的形成過程:以華為為例

China's Innovative Sandbox and the Formation of the Privately-Owned National Champions: A Case Study on Huawei

Abstracts


中國國家資本主義是一種國家主導與學習的雙向型態,本文稱之為「具雙向試驗性中國國家資本主義」。在自上而下方面,中國共產黨擁有絕對的權力,但是當市場出現新變化或新行動者,此時國家會以市場承諾做為管理新資本家的工具。在自下而上方面,創新活動除了提供國家市場管理方式的調適,也為政府擇優協助的思維提供具體的運作機制。面對新變化或新行動者產生制度真空時,中國透過試驗性質的企業選擇機制,從而選擇冠軍企業,在新創產業冠軍私企能夠抗衡官僚機構和抵禦既有制度的約束。以資訊產業的通訊技術研發為例,國有企業礙於產權受制於國資委,造成短期研發決策趨向。是以,冠軍私企不單是增加市場份額的領頭羊,更是中國調適統治方式的利益代表。

Parallel abstracts


Chinese state capitalism is bidirectional, which the government will conduct the market and learn from the market; therefore, we recognize it as Chinese bidirectional and experimental state-capitalism. On the one hand, although the Chinese government has the absolute authority, while the new changes or actors emerge in the market, the government will manage those changes or actors by means of their promise on the market. On the other hand, the innovative activities provide not only the adjustment of managing market but also the concrete mechanism of how the government chooses the enterprises to assist. Facing the institutional vacuum created by the innovation or the new actors, China chooses the certain enterprise to be the national champion by means of the experimental mechanism. Meanwhile, the existence of the privately-owned national champion is necessary for the innovative activities in China to balance the involvement of the bureaucracy and the restrictions of the existed institution. The startup company in the information industry is a good example. The state-owned enterprises can not development design policy is restricted as well, due to the existence of SASAC. Thus, the privately-owned national champion is not only the leader of the market share, but also the interest representative of China's adjustment of market policy.

References


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