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Using Rebate Rules to Provide and Value Threshold Public Goods: An Overview of Experimental Economic Research with Implications for Natural Resources Management
應用退還規則以提供及評價門檻公共財：有關自然資源經營之試驗經濟研究綜觀
摘要
此報告回顧有關應用退還規則以提供及評價門檻公共財之試驗經濟研究，此種公共財不能只提供一部分，僅能在超過某種成本之後提供全部，其稱為提供點或門檻。如果籌款成果符合或超過提供點，那麼公共財就被提供；否則，就不提供。許多公共財是屬於門檻類型，包括橋樑、燈塔、以及供作保育計畫與公共公園的特定土地。提供1/2座橋樑或在保育保留地網絡中為野生動物移動而連接2個保育區所需的1/3廊道，則無多大意義。如果總捐獻超過提供點，退還規則決定超額捐獻的命運。本報告認為在自然資源經營中，退還規則有2種一般用途。一種是籌募基金藉土地購買或開發權利購買以保護自然資源，另一種是評價自然資源。本報告簡要回顧退還規則之應用在條例評估法的效度檢測，這是在真實但假設條件下，廣泛用來評估自然資源價值的一種調查方法。
並列摘要
This paper reviews experimental economic research on the use of rebate rules in providing and valuing threshold public goods, which are goods that cannot be provided in part, but only in whole after a certain cost, called a provision point or threshold, is covered. If fundraising efforts meet or exceed the provision point, then the public good is provided; otherwise, it is not. Many public goods are of the threshold type, including bridges, lighthouses, and specific plots of land for conservation programs and public parks. It would not make much sense to provide 1/2 a bridge or 1/3 of a corridor needed to connect two conservation areas for the movement of wildlife in a conservation reserve network. In the event total contributions collected exceed the provision point, rebate rules determine the fate of excess contributions. The paper argues that there are two general uses for rebate rules in natural resources management. One is in raising the funds to protect natural resources through the purchase of land or the purchase of development rights, while the other is in valuing natural resources. The paper briefly reviews the use of rebate rules in validity tests of the contingent valuation method, a survey method widely used to estimate the value of natural resources under realistic, but hypothetical, conditions.