本文認為中央政府的角色、行為與政策,決定了分配結果。本文試圖從民進黨在立法院席次比例與民進黨總統職位控制為形式的政治權力資源,檢視對市場收入分配不平等程度與政府重分配幅度的影響。資料來源為行政院主計總處家庭收支調查,資料涵蓋的時間從1978年至2020年台灣家庭重分配前與重分配後收入不平等的情況。運用誤差修正模型(error correction models)處理政黨動態因素對重分配與經濟不平等的效果。研究發現民進黨在立法院中的實力不僅對重分配具有直接效果,對於經濟不平等的降低也有直接影響。然而,以民進黨控制總統職位為形式的政治權力資源會降低政府重分配比例,但長期而言它卻會加深經濟不平等的程度,主要是總統施政受到國家對資本的結構依賴邏輯以及選舉制度的運作方式所侷限。
The goal of this research is to test an empirical model of distributional outcomes that explores the impact of aggregate level of political dynamics. This paper addresses on the central questions: Do national election outcomes influence distributional outcomes? The arguments suggest that when the political landscape changes - a different party takes over the presidency, the ideological direction of public policy shifts, or the mood of the public changes - income inequality responds in consistent and predictable ways. Shifts to the left produce more egalitarian outcomes and shifts to the right exacerbate existing inequality. Economic conditions matter for distributional outcomes, but political dynamics matter as much. The influence of politics, de facto, manifests itself in some surprising ways. This paper demonstrates that government to influence distributional outcomes via explicit redistribution, but government also shapes income inequality by conditioning market outcomes. In fact, this mechanism of distributional impact is as strong as redistribution.