Following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018 and the ensuing reinstalled regime of biting sanctions against Tehran, Iran's lack of access to the international banking system left it with few options but to rely on some of its major commercial partners, China in particular, to sidestep part of those financial and banking restrictions and penalties. Arguing that China has so far left a mixed record in its financial and banking relationship with the Middle Eastern country over the past several years, therefore, the present research tries to shed some light on the nature and scope of Beijing's anticipated role in easing some of Tehran's financial and banking troubles in the wake of relentless American pressures. On the positive side, the Chinese provided, either directly or through third parties, a lot of financial and banking services for the Iranians. Not only the Chinese government often looked the other way when such rather furtive interactions were taking place between the two sides, it also turned China into a safe haven for a large sum of the financial reserves which Iran had already moved from Europe to the East Asian country. On the negative side, the Chinese contributed little to Iran's de-dollarization campaign, while they disappointed gratuitously some pro-China forces among certain conservative authorities in the Islamic Republic by demanding from Tehran to join the FATF before engaging in any close banking and financial partnership involving the two countries.