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  • 期刊

全球金融危機、董監事責任險和投資不足-來自臺灣公司的研究

Global Financial Crisis, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Underinvestment-Evidence from Taiwanese Companies

摘要


本研究為首次探討全球金融危機(GFC)對D&O保險與公司投資效率關聯性影響的研究。實證結果顯示,D&O保險在GFC期間或之後對公司過度投資無顯著影響,亦在於GFC期間對公司投資不足沒有明顯影響。然而,D&O保險在GFC之後顯著地緩和了公司投資不足。這些發現對於政策制定者、公司與投資者在推動D&O保險政策,追求投資效率具有重要的投資及管理決策意涵。

並列摘要


This study is the first to explore the effect of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the relationship between directors and officers (D&O) insurance and investment efficiency. The empirical results show that D&O insurance did not have a significant impact on the level of overinvestment during or after the GFC, nor did D&O insurance have a significant impact on the level of underinvestment during the GFC. However, D&O insurance significantly mitigated underinvestment after the GFC. These findings have valuable implications for policymakers, corporations, and investors in terms of promoting D&O insurance policies, seeking investment efficiency, and making informed decisions.

參考文獻


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