摘要
被害人自負風險的行為如何影響行為人的不法，是刑法釋義學上爭議已久的問題。本文主張，要澈底解決這個爭議，必須開展一個同時考量行為人與被害人之間人際互動與法律地位的刑事不法概念，而這種刑事不法概念受到康德的自由的法概念所啟發。正是因為被害人在犯罪行為發生之前，就參與了他與行為人之間的法權關係，被害人才有形塑該法權關係的實力，能夠影響行為人的不法。但是，並非所有的被害人自負風險的事例都必須在同一個歸責判斷層次上排除行為人的不法，毋寧依據「規範理論」與「論證理論」，應該將此等事例區分為「參與被害人的自我危害」以及「被害人同意他人危害」這兩種類型。前者的類型中，行為人並未製造法所不容許的風險；後者的類型中，行為人的行為可能適用「得被害人的承諾」而阻卻違法。無論何種被害人自我危害的類型，被害人都必須完全認知具體的危險行動所蘊含的風險，並且自主決定涉入該風險。學說上雖然有認為，實定法上若干家父長主義式的規範會封鎖排除行為人不法的效果，但是這些規範或者有正當性的疑慮，或者不適用於被害人自負風險的事例。
並列摘要
The question of how the victim's self-endangerment affects the perpetrator's criminal wrong has been a long-standing controversy in the doctrinal theory of criminal law. This paper argues that in order to resolve this controversy definitively, it is necessary to develop a concept of criminal wrongs that takes both the interpersonal interaction and the legal status of the perpetrator and the victim into account, and that such a concept is inspired by Kant's concept of the law of freedom. Because the victim participates in the legal relationship between himself and the perpetrator before the criminal act occurs, the victim has the power to shape the contents of that relationship and to influence the perpetrator's wrong. However, not all cases of victim self-endangerment must exclude the wrong of the perpetrator at the same level of imputation. Rather, in accordance with the norm theory and the theory of argument, these cases should be divided into two types: participation in the victim's self-endangerment and victim's consent to the endangerment of others. In the former type, the perpetrator does not create a legally impermissible risk; in the latter type, the perpetrator's behaviour may be justified with the victim's consent. Regardless of the type of victim's self-endangerment, the victim must be fully aware of the risk inherent in the specific dangerous action and must make an autonomous decision to engage in that risk. Although it has been argued that certain paternalistic norms will block the effect of precluding the perpetrator's wrong, there may be doubts about the legitimacy of these norms and they may not be applicable in cases where the victim has taken the risk. As long as the relevant rules of conduct also protect the individual rights of the victim, the question of whether the victim's conduct precludes the perpetrator's criminal wrong depends only on the victim's perception of the specific risk and his or her autonomous decision to take the risk.