不完全契約與夥伴關係－促進民間參與公共建設個案之研究

Incomplete Contract and Partnerships: A Case Study on Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects

曾冠球(Kuan-chiu Tseng)

《臺灣民主季刊》 16卷3期 (2019/09) Pp. 59-112

摘要

經濟學家早已發展出不完全契約理論，用以分析契約無效率的成因。由於交易契約難免有所疏漏，買、賣雙方因而擁有某種裁量權，這意味著各造的決定未必能獲得對方的苟同。不完全契約衍生出一些裁量空間，致使契約各造得以做出一些可能影響彼此互動關係的裁決。遺憾的是，有關公私合夥與不完全契約理論的經驗研究仍極為罕見。既有的契約管理知識大多是以完全契約為基礎，然而，一旦我們將注意力轉移到契約條款之外，並深入到契約生命週期之中，將會因此發現：對於公、私部門管理者如何及為何運用手中握有的剩餘控制權，及其對於契約效率帶來的影響，我們所知其實十分有限。職是之故，本研究擬透過個案研究法，並運用半結構式訪談來蒐集資料，同時搭配投資契約與其他官方文件進行綜合分析。本研究致力於補充契約管理文獻既有知識的不足，同時對於公共與私人契約管理者，如何運用不完全契約、財產權理論及關係契約的洞見，以克服長期契約管理之挑戰，也試圖多提供一些見解。

關鍵字

不完全契約 ； 剩餘控制權 ； 公私合夥 ； 促進民間參與公共建設（促參）

並列摘要

The economists develop the incomplete contracting theory to analyze how to furthest avoid the inefficiency due to contractual completeness. The contract for the exchange is incomplete so that the buyer and seller have room for discretion, which means to behave in ways the other did not fully agree to. Incomplete contracts create a zone of discretion in which both parties can make choices that influence the outcomes they both receive. Unfortunately, empirical analyses relating to PPPs and incomplete contracting theory are few. Our knowledge of contract management is largely rooted in complete contracts, yet as we move beyond contract specification and further into the contract lifecycle, we know little about how and why public and private managers exert their residual rights of control, and its potential impacts on the efficiency of contract. In this research, the author will turn to case study approach to assess current and past PPP relationships and to exact lessons for future partnerships. A semi-structured interview protocol will be developed to interview respondents. Contract documentation and supplemental documentation will also be obtained from interviewed public managers. Our expected results will contribute to the literature on contract management capacity as well as our better understanding of how public and private contract managers use incomplete contracting theory, property rights theory, and relational contracting to consciously discern and overcome managerial challenges of long-term contract in the field of PPP.

並列關鍵字

incomplete contracting theory ； residual right of control ； public-private partnership ； promotion of private participation in infrastructure projects

參考文獻

Rausser, Gordon and Holly Ameden (2013). “Incomplete Contracts and Public-private Partnerships.” In Piet de Vries and Eteinne Yehoue (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Public-private Partnerships (Chapter 10). New York: Routledge.

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Valero, Vanessa (2015). “Government Opportunism in Public-private Partnerships.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 17, No. 1:111-35.

Van Den Hurk, Martijn and Koen Verhoest (2016). “The Challenge of Using Standard Contracts in Public–private Partnerships.” Public Management Review, Vol. 18, No. 2:278-99.

Wang, Huanming, Wei Xiong, Guangdong Wu, and Dajian Zhu (2018). “Public-private Partnership in Public Administration Discipline: A Literature Review.” Public Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 2:293-316.