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威權憲制－解釋蔣介石三連任總統的決策過程與國民黨威權政體的制度化
Authoritarian Constitutional Institutions: Explaining the Decision-making Process toward Chiang Kai-shek's Third Presidential Term and the Institutionalization of the Kuomintang's Authoritarian Regime
摘要
威權政體並未落實憲法人權保障條款與權力制衡原則，憲法也難以約束威權統治者，因此既有研究較少關注憲法在威權統治中的作用。然而，憲法不只可以提供威權統治合法性，威權統治者與政治菁英也能將憲法的權力制衡原則轉化為權力分配，並據此相互合作與運作政府。由於威權政府未曾落實人權保障，也不接受社會的課責，因此本文將之稱為「威權憲制」。本文以1960年的蔣介石為例，說明蔣介石為了三連任總統，而依循憲政規範修改《動員戡亂時期臨時條款》，合法持續執政。政治菁英則是運用蔣介石維繫統治地位合法性的需求，一方面與蔣介石議價而獲益，另一方面以憲政規範約束蔣介石。當政治菁英與威權統治者長期依循威權憲制進行政治互動、權力分享與利益交換，不只能鞏固威權憲制的約束能力，也能促使威權政體制度化。因此本文也將指出蔣介石三連任總統後，國民黨威權政體進一步藉由《臨時條款》制度化。
並列摘要
Authoritarian regimes rarely, if ever, implement human rights protection clauses inscribed in constitutions or follow the principle of checks and balances. Authoritarian rulers are also rarely constrained by their respective countries' constitutions. For these reasons, existing studies have paid little attention to the role of the constitution in authoritarian countries. Constitutions, nonetheless, can provide legality to authoritarian rule. Furthermore, the authoritarian ruler and political elites can transform the constitution's checks-and-balances principle into a legal basis for the distribution of power, according to which the ruler and the elites cooperate in running the government. Because authoritarian governments neither protect human rights nor are not held accountable, the article refers to this practice as ＂authoritarian constitutional institutions.＂ This article takes the case of Chiang Kai-shek in 1960 as an example to illustrate that he, in order to be re-elected for a third presidential term ＂legally,＂ followed constitutional norms to amend ＂the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.＂ Taking advantage of Chiang's need to maintain the legality of his rule, political elites not only bargained with the strongman to further their own interests but also used constitutional norms to restrain Chiang's power. When political elites and the authoritarian ruler strictly adhered to authoritarian constitutional institutions in their political interactions, for power-sharing purposes, and during interest exchanges, not only was the restraining capacity of authoritarian constitutional institutions consolidated, but the authoritarian regime was also thereby institutionalized. This article shows that after Chiang Kai-shek was elected for a third time, the Kuomintang's authoritarian regime was further institutionalized by the amended ＂Temporary Provisions.＂