- 期刊
南韓對美協商移轉「戰時作戰管制」之發展與挑戰
Development and Challenge to South Korea's Negotiation with the U.S. on ＂Wartime OPCON＂ Transition
摘要
「戰時作戰管制」是一國軍事主權的象徵，更是韓美同盟軍事安全合作的關鍵指標。金泳三政府時期已先與美方協商收回「平時作戰管制」（Peacetime Operational Control, OPCON），南韓自盧武鉉啟動與美國協商移轉「戰時作戰管制」，但歷經李明博與朴槿惠兩任政府推遲移轉時程，直到文在寅政府宣布重新推動，規劃於2022年任期結束前完成。然而，受到朝鮮半島安全環境變化與美國印太軍力部署的整體考量，使韓美對移轉「戰時作戰管制」雖具共識，但對「條件評估」與「時程規劃」明顯存在分歧。再者，南韓國內「進步派」和「保守派」，對移轉「戰時作戰管制」與韓美同盟關係的認知存在差異，移轉過程又需經由韓美聯合軍演的驗證，通過美方檢核韓軍具備指揮聯合作戰體系的「能力」，都牽動兩韓關係、美國與北韓「無核化」談判等相關因素，使南韓實現移轉「戰時作戰管制」仍面臨諸多挑戰。
並列摘要
＂Wartime Operational Control＂(Wartime OPCON) is not only the symbol of military sovereignty but also represents key indicator of military and security cooperation of the Korea-U.S. alliance. President Kim Young-sam had taken back the ＂Peacetime OPCON ＂from the United States via negotiation. Roh Moo-hyun administration started to negotiate with the U.S. on ＂Wartime OPCON＂ transition. However, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administration postponed it for two times until President Moon Jae-in announced his transition schedule for taking back Wartime OPCON from the U.S. within the end of his presidential term in 2022. Due to the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and consideration of the U.S. Indo-Pacific military deployment, South Korea and the U.S. have made a consensus on the Wartime OPCON transition. However, there are apparent differences in ＂conditional assessment＂ and ＂time arrangement＂ for transition. Furthermore, ＂Progressives＂ and ＂Co nservatives＂ in South Korea hold different perceptions of the Wartime OPCON transition and its relation with the Korea-U.S. alliance. South Korean military must verify itself for command joint combat system capability via Korea-U.S. joint military exercise, which has much to do with relation-improvement between South Korea and North Korea and denuclearization negotiation. Therefore, South Korea would face formidable challenges to take back the Wartime OPCON from the U.S.