This article describes the Mexican system for electoral conflict resolution from a comparative perspective. It starts with an overview of five different conflict resolution systems and their role in closely fought elections: political bodies or assemblies, usually legislatures or, in some cases, a representative electoral college; ordinary judges (with no specialization in electoral matters), who are part of the judicial system, usually under supreme court jurisdiction; constitutional courts which are not part of the judicial branch; electoral courts, some of which are part of the judiciary and others autonomous from the three traditional powers; and ad hoc provisional bodies in temporary regimes. The author then describes the Mexican system, established with the constitutional and legal reform of 1996, which gave the Electoral Court of the Judicial Power of the Federation (EC) the final say on challenges to all federal electoral and local electoral results. He argues that the role of the EC has acted with an antiformalist spirit and as a guarantor, favoring the protection of fundamental political-electoral rights, and the application of the constitutional and legal norms that must be followed by electoral authorities and parties, alike, and highlights the importance of the transparency of the EC. The author concludes that the Mexican system for the resolution of electoral conflicts has contributed significantly to the transition from a hegemonic party system to an increasingly pluralistic and competitive one, helping to guarantee respect for democratic rule of law based on respect for basic political-electoral rights and free elections in strict accordance with the constitution and the law.