信用分配：一個簡單模型的說明

Credit Rationing: The Description of a Simple Model

陳啟益(Chi-Yi Chen) ； 張文檀(Wen-Tan Chang)

《南亞學報》 31期 (2011/12) Pp. 407-426

https://doi.org/10.6989/JN.201112.0407

摘要

本文旨在以一個簡單模型，重新闡述Stiglitz and Weiss（1981）所稱資訊不對稱與信用分配之關係，並進一步依據此一簡單模型，說明如何利用抵押品減少信用分配情形的發生。信用市場的逆向選擇是指在貸款發放前，貸款人提高利率可能導致低風險借款人退出信用市場，而留在市場者僅是高風險的借款人。至於信用市場的道德危險，則是指貸款人提高貸款利率將影響借款人投資方案的選擇；高貸款利率促使借款人選擇較高風險投資方案。信用分配均衡除了饒富理論旨趣外，亦深具政策意含。

關鍵字

信用分配 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 逆向選擇 ； 道德危險 ； 抵押品

並列摘要

This paper provides a simple mode to restate the relationship between information asymmetry and credit rationing referred by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). And further, based on this model, it illustrates how to use the collateral to reduce credit rationing occurring. Adverse selection in credit markets means the raising of interest rates by lenders before loans may cause low-risk borrowers to exit the credit market, and only high-risk borrowers stay in the market. The moral hazard in the credit markets means the raising of lending rates will affect the choice of the borrowers' investment project; high interest rates make borrowers select higher risk investment projects. The credit rationing equilibrium theory is not only interesting, but also has policies meaning.

並列關鍵字

credit rationing ； asymmetric information ； adverse selection ； moral hazard ； collateral