私募普通股的利益掠奪效果與公司治理之關聯性

The Relationship between Entrenchment Factors of Private Placements and Corporate Governance

黃瀚緯(Hann-Wei Huang) ； 王茂昌(Mao-Chang Wang)

《評價學報》 Issue 11 (2017/08) Pp. 1-20

Abstracts

台灣於2002年2月在證券交易法中增訂私募制度，這對於有迫切的資金需求和因財務困難而不易籌資的公司，提供了一個迅速及方便的籌措資金的方式。本文係檢視私募普通股而產生的掠奪原股東利益之效果，其衡量指標包括：私募折價幅度、私募發行股數占原已實際發行股數之比例，並探討其與公司治理之關聯性。研究發現，限制內部應募人的私募金額，及限制應募人擔任董事，公司治理特徵之大股東持股比率較低、聘請獨立董事、董事持股比率較高，皆會降低私募普通股的利益掠奪效果。

Keywords

私募折價 ； 私募股數比例 ； 內部應募人 ； 私募利益掠奪效果 ； 公司治理

Parallel abstracts

The Taiwanese legislative unit updated private placement system in Securities Exchange Act on February, 2002, and provides a rapid and convenient financing way for companies which have urgent needs of funds and are difficult to borrow funds due to financial difficulties. This paper examined the private placement and entrenchment factors of interests of the original shareholders, which were measured by the discount range of private placement and the ratio of private placement equity to original capital, and further discuss the role of corporate governance. The results found that the limitation of private placement amount of inside investor, limitation of subscriber to act for director, and the corporate governance features, for examples, shareholding ratio of major shareholders, employment of independent director and higher shareholding ratio of directors will reduce the entrenchment factors of private placements.

Parallel keywords

Discount of Private Placement ； Private Placement Equity Ratio ； Inside Investor ； Entrenchment Factors of Private Placements ； Corporate Governance