審計委員會品質對銀行業盈餘管理的影響

The Effects of the Audit Committees Quality on Earnings Management of Banks

廖秀梅(Hsiu-Mei Liao) ； 江佳欣(Chia-Hsin Chiang) ； 史雅男(Ya-Nan Shih)

《評價學報》 Issue 14 (2021/12) Pp. 23-44

Abstracts

本研究以2014年至2019年上市銀行為研究對象，探討審計委員會開會次數、出席狀況、召集人是否具備財務專長、成員具備財務專長及公司治理專長等不同運作品質是否會影響銀行業之盈餘管理。實證結果發現，審計委員會的出席率越高，銀行業之盈餘管理幅度越低。其次，本研究進一步將裁決性壞帳分成正負兩個子樣本，則發現當審計委員會實際出席率越高以及成員具備財務專長及治理專長時，越能抑制管理當局操縱增加盈餘的行為，而審計委員會開會次數越高與成員具備財務專長時，反而會允許管理當局操縱減少盈餘的行為（對公司保守的盈餘管理樂觀其成）。換言之，不同審計委員會的運作品質對於管理當局操縱盈餘增加或減少的行為關切的程度並不相同。

Keywords

銀行業 ； 審計委員會品質 ； 盈餘管理

Parallel abstracts

Using banks listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2014 to 2019 as a sample, this study examines the effects of the audit committees (AC hereafter) quality on earnings management. The audit committee quality was included the frequency of meetings, and the attendance of members, whether the convener has expertise in finance, the numbers of member with expertise in finance and expertise in corporate governance. The empirical results show that banks with higher members' attendance of AC have lower earnings management. In addition, we further divide abnormal bad expense into two subsamples, the results indicate that AC with higher members' attendance, members with expertise in finance and in corporate governance can restrain manager's manipulation of earnings to increase. However, AC with higher the frequency of meetings, members with expertise in finance will allow manager's manipulation of earnings to decrease (optimistic about the company's conservative earnings management). In other words, the different qualities of audit committees have different levels of concern for manager's manipulation of earnings to increase or decrease.

Parallel keywords

Banking Industry ； Audit Committee Quality ； Earnings Management