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非擔任主管職務之全時員工薪資與企業揭露員工薪資調整情形之關聯性研究

The Relation between Non-Executive Full-Time Employee Compensation and the Disclosure of Employee Salary Adjustment

摘要


有別於過去企業社會責任資訊揭露之文獻大多聚焦於環境構面,本研究以2018年至2019年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,從社會構面資訊揭露的角度出發,探討非擔任主管職務之全時員工薪資水準是否與公司自願揭露非主管員工薪資調整情形存在關聯,並進一步檢視非主管員工薪資水準是否影響公司對於非主管員工薪資之調整與否及調幅大小。實證結果指出公司的非主管員工平均薪資愈高時,其自願揭露非主管員工薪資調整情形之可能性愈高。此外,在有揭露非主管員工薪資調整情形的公司中,當非主管員工平均薪資愈高時,公司愈可能對其非主管員工進行調薪,且平均薪資調幅也愈大。是以,本研究之實證結果支持自願性揭露理論。最後,額外測試之結果顯示非主管員工薪資水準之強制揭露政策並未能促使相對低薪之企業改善其員工薪資待遇,此一發現有助於了解企業對基層員工權益維護資訊之相關揭露及其經濟後果,並提供政策意涵。

並列摘要


In contrast with prior research that mostly focuses on the voluntary disclosure of environmental corporate social responsibility, our study examines corporate voluntary disclosure from a social perspective. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed companies from 2018 to 2019, we first examine the relationship between the pay level of nonexecutive full-time employees and the incidence of voluntary disclosure of the pay adjustments for non-executive full-time employees. Second, for firms voluntarily disclosing their pay adjustments, we then examine whether the pay level of nonexecutive employees is associated with the incidence and the magnitude of the pay adjustments. The results indicate that the average pay of non-executive employees is positively associated with the likelihood of voluntarily disclosing pay adjustments for non-executive employees. In addition, for the firms that voluntarily disclose their pay adjustments for non-executive employees, we find that the average pay of nonexecutive employees is positively associated with the incidence and the magnitude of pay adjustments for non-executive employees. Accordingly, our results are consistent with the voluntary disclosure theory. Finally, additional analyses show that the mandatory disclosure policy on the pay levels of non-executive employees cannot bring low-wage companies a real effect on raising employee salaries. This finding is conducive to understanding the disclosure and economic consequences of information on the protection of rights and interests of non-executive employees and provides policy implications.

參考文獻


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