摘要
在比較哲學的領域裏，史賓諾莎（Baruch Spinoza, 1632-1677）是西方的傑出代表。因為他不僅說到做到、言行一致，而且提出一套可以付諸實行的理論。有人將他與佛陀相互比較，主要即是基於上述原因，同時他的理論也被拿來與中國大乘佛學以及與王陽明（1472-1529）相互比較。無論這些比較研究的成果如何豐碩，它們所注意的只是史賓諾莎哲學的某一部分」。譬如，史賓諾莎哲學與大乘佛學是在沈思默觀的實踐方面相互參照；它與王陽明學說則是在知識與行動的關係方面相互參照。這些比較研究的結論却相當奇特：前者主張史賓諾莎對於「頓悟」與「漸悟」有一些觀念，後者肯定史賓諾莎與王陽明兩人都是「實用主義者」。這些研究的結論之所以顯得奇特，問題出在它們沒有能夠把史氏的哲學當做一個整體來看。研究史氏而撇開他的實體理論不談，究竟能夠得出什麼成績？答案似乎並不樂觀。若形容史氏為一位「沈醉於上帝的人」，固然需要提出頗為複雜的說明；但是若肯定上帝或實體是他的終極預設，則無疑是一項自明的事實。相較之下，佛陀以實體為「空」，王陽明則以實體為「唯心論的」。由於彼此之間實體理論適度分歧，上述比較研究的結果並不理想。然而，若以老子（「道德經」的作者，生平不詳，至於其作品是否紀元前五、六世紀寫成者，亦不可考）為東方的代表，並與史賓諾莎相互比較，則上述困難將會減至最低程度。我這樣說，並非不知道下述事實：史氏的代表作「倫理學」是哲學與最具系統的作品之一，而老子的「道德經」則是哲學界最片設及最難解的作品之一。我同時也知道他們二人在思想、文化、社會方面，具有極為殊異的背景。我之所以從事這一比較，實是因為相信他們二人對於「永恆哲學」都作出積極的貢獻。一如史賓諾莎，老子也可以被描述為一位自然主義者（因為他以自然為至德），一位泛神論者（或者更好說是，一位泛道論者，因為他相信道生萬物），一位決定論者（因為萬物註定要復歸其根），或甚至一位「沈醉於道的人」（因為道是他的終極關懷）。同樣地，一如史賓諾莎的情形，以上這些名稱只能算是綽號，對於我們之理解老子哲學的整體，並無多大幫助。本文基本上將以史賓諾莎「倫理學」的大綱為準，進行討論，至於老子「道德經」中無法找到相應部分者，則略而不談；譬如史氏的屬性理論就承載了西方傳統過多的預定觀念，還有像心身關係問題也是無法徹底解決的。從另一方面看來，老子對於史氏含糊提及的「人性典型」卻作了明確描述，亦即指出如何經由人的知識以達到自由。因此，本文依序討論以下四個問題：（一）實體與道之超越面，（二）實體與道之內存面，（三）知識的力量，（四）人的自由。
關鍵字
無資料並列摘要
In the field of comparative philosophy, Spinoza is a prominent representative of the West. The reason is not only that he practiced what he preached, but also that he preached a doctrine which could be practiced. It is mainly on the latter point that he is compared with Buddha, and his doctrine is compared with that of Mahayana Buddhism as well as with that of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529, an eminent idealist in Chinese Neo-Confucianism). No matter how fruitful these studies might be, they all center on a ”part” of Spinoza's philosophy. For example, Spinoza's philosophy is compared with Mahayana Buddhsim with regard to the practice of meditation, and' with Wang Yang-ming's doctrine with regard to relations between knowledge and action. The conclusions of these comparisons are quite peculiar: the former contends that Spinoza has some ideas concerning ”sudden” and ”gradual” enlightenments, while the latter affirms both Spinoza and Wang Yang-ming as ”pragrriatists.” The trouble here lies in their failing to treat Spinoza's philosophy as a whole. How far can a study of Spinoza go without touching his theory of Substance or God? The answer is not encouraging. To characterize Spinoza as a ”God-intoxicated man” requires a complex explanation, but to affirm God or Substance as his ultimate presupposition is nonetheless self-evident. By contrast, Substance for Buddhism is ”empty” and for Wang Yang-ming ”idealistic.” The divergence on the doctrine of Substance inevitably leads to the undesirable comparisons which have just been referred to.However, if we truce Lao Tzu (the auther of Tao Te Ching which appeared around the fifth or sixth cenh.iry B.C.) as the represeritative of the East to compare with Spinoza, the above difficulties will be reduced to a minimal degree. In saying this, I am quite aware that Spinoza's masterpiece, Ethics, is one of the most systematically formulated works in the philosophical world, while Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching goes to the other extreme in being one of the most fragmentary and enigmatic works of philosophy. I am also aware of their remarkably different background 'in thought, culture, and society. My confidence in doing this comparison primarily consists in that both Spinoza and Lao Tzu have contributed something to the ”perennial philosophy.” Like Spinoza, Lao Tzu can also be characterized as a naturalist (in that for him naturalness is the supreme virtue), a pantheist (or more adequately speaking, a pantaoist in that he believes that Tao generates all beings), a determinist (in that all beings are determined to return to their roots), or even a Tao-intoxicated man (in that Tao is his ultimate concern). Again, like in the case of Spinoza, all these titles are mere epithets which contribute little to the understanding of Lao Tzu's philosophy as a whole.Basically, this study will follow the general sketch of Spinoza's Ethics save for some parts for which we find no correspondent discussion in Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching. In this I am referring to Spinoza's theory of attributes which is loaded with many preconceptions of western tradition, and the consequent theory of the mind/body relation which, once it occurs, can be in no way satisfactorily solved. On the other hand, Lao Tzu explicitly describes what Spinoza vaguely mentions about the ”model of human nature” which involves direct impact on the theory of human freedom via human knowledge. Thus, the following discussion will in turn focus on four points: 1) the transcendent aspect of Substance and Tao; 2) the immanent aspect of Substance and Tao; 3) the power of knowledge; and 4) the freedom of human beings.