本文以滯臺藏人聲請暫時權利保護事件為例,重新檢視暫時權利保護制度,本文將以最高行政法院109年度裁字第786、787、788及789號裁定為分析對象,該裁定之特殊點在於落實兩公約之精神,並將國際法上之不遣返原則納入對於滯臺藏人聲請暫時權利保護要件之判斷,裁定於本案裁判確定前,聲請人得暫時居留。本文比較臺北高等行政法院與最高行政法院在本件驅逐出境處分之停止執行之見解,更進一步以在該領域累積類似案例之歐洲人權法院判決為比較法對象,試圖探究滯臺藏人驅逐出境處分事件之特殊性。本文主張我國之暫時性權利保護制度,應細緻地針對各種案件予以類型化,分別設計不同審酌是否准予暫時性權利保護之判斷基準,然在現行制度下,透過法院對於行政訴訟法第116條第2項之解釋與適用,肯認國際法不遣返原則之前提下,本案訴訟似具有高度之勝訴蓋然性,亦可滿足本文認為在類此案件中應以停止執行為原則之主張。
The article takes the case of stateless persons (Tibetans in Taiwan) applying for interim relief as an example to re-examine the system of interim relief, analyzing the Taiwan Supreme Administrative Court Rulings (Cases (109) Cai Tzu No. 786, 787, 788, 789). The feature of the rulings is that they implement the spirits of the ICCPR and ICESCR, and incorporate the principle of non-refoulement in international law into the judgment on the requirements for stateless persons to apply for interim relief. The article compares the rulings of the Taipei High Administrative Court and the Taiwan Supreme Administrative Court on the suspension of expulsion. Further, taking the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, which has accumulated many cases in this field, as the object of comparative law, the article attempts to explore the specialty of the expulsion of stateless persons. The article argues that the system of interim relief in Taiwan should be more carefully classified according to different types of cases. Nevertheless, the principle of suspension of expulsion of stateless persons could be established through the court's interpretation and application of Article 116(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act without amending law. The specialty of the suspension of expulsion of stateless persons should take the principle of non-refoulement into consideration, and the suspension of expulsion of stateless persons should be the principle.