一、菲律賓總統小馬可仕於2022年6月就任初期,延續前任總統杜特蒂的親「中」路線,然自2023年2月美國國防部長奧斯汀訪問菲國並加強雙邊安全合作後,除引發中共不滿,更讓兩國關係急轉直下。二、激化「中」、菲摩擦的原因,與美、菲、「中」各自的戰略考量有關,美國期望藉拉攏菲國,以堅守在東南亞地區最重要的地緣政治堡壘,並牽制中共對臺海、南海的安全威脅;菲律賓則試圖在美、「中」之間左右逢源的尋求國家利益最大化。至於「中」方旨在經濟上獲取南海自然資源,並在政治上以「打游擊」方式,測試美軍協防底線,三方各有所圖。三、菲律賓刻正藉操作「戰爭邊緣」策略獲益,因此局勢仍呈現高度可控制性;至於日本、澳洲等鄰近的親美國家對南海爭議的立場,已明確表態支持菲國,而域內的東南亞國家仍相當克制,不願因此與中共交惡,後續發展仍待關注。
1.When Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office as President of the Philippines, he continued the pro-CCP line of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. However, since U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the Philippines in February 2023 and strengthened bilateral security cooperation, it aroused dissatisfaction with the CCP, and the Philippines and "China" The relationship took a turn for the worse. 2.The reasons for intensifying the friction between the Philippines and CCP in the South China Sea are related to the strategic considerations of the U.S., the Philippines, and CCP: the U.S. hopes that by winning over the Philippines, it can maintain its most important geopolitical fortress in Southeast Asia and contain the CCP's actions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea; the Philippines tries to play both sides between the U.S. and CCP to maximize its national interests; the CCP seeks to seize the natural resources of the South China Sea economically and politically tests the bottom line of U.S. defense commitment. 3.What the Philippines is currently doing is benefiting from the "brinkmanship" strategy. Therefore, the situation remains highly controllable. As for the stance of other countries on the South China Sea dispute, neighboring pro-U.S. countries such as Japan and Australia have clearly stated their support for the Philippines, while Southeast Asian countries have shown considerable restraint and are unwilling to worsen relations with the CCP.