- 期刊
An Empirical Study of Corruption within China's State-owned Enterprises
摘要
China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been harmed greatly by corrupt practices committed by insiders, especially those by the general managers. This article explores why SOE general managers abuse their power and how they manage to do so. First of all, the author argues that given the very limited income provided by the enterprises, many managers have developed strong incentives to enrich themselves by abusing their power. Second, decentralization of the managerial power of SOEs, which is an important reform policy, enables general managers to control the most lucrative activities of the enterprises. Various corrupt opportunities, including both those given by the system and the ones general managers have created, further facilitate their corrupt practices, and the institutional weakness of existing supervision systems provides a relatively safe environment for the general managers' adventures. It is the combination of all of these factors that has led to rampant corruption within China's SOEs.